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ABSTRACT 
The vigorous impact of the Web in time and space arises from the 
fact that it motivates massive creation, editing and distribution of 
information by Users with little knowledge. This unprecedented 
continuum provides novel opportunities for innovation but also 
puts under jeopardy its survival as a stable construct that nurtures 
a complex system of connections. We examine the Web as an 
ethics determined space by demonstrating Hayek’s theory of 
freedom in a three-leveled Web: technological, contextualized and 
economic. Our approach accounts for the co-dependence of code 
and values, and assumes that the Web is a self-contained system 
that exists in and by itself. This view of internal Web ethics 
directly connects the concept of freedom with issues like 
centralization of traffic and data control, rights on visiting log file, 
custom User profiles and the interplay among function, structure 
and morality of the Web. It is also demonstrated, in the case of 
Net Neutrality, that generic freedom-coercion trade-offs are 
incomplete in treating specific cases at work.  
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
WSSC: “webscience.org/2010/E.4.3 Ethics in the Web” 
Keywords 
Web ethics, freedom, economic Web, contextualized Web, 
centralization of traffic and data control.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
The amount of information on the Web is growing exponentially. 
Only in YouTube, 48 hours of video are uploaded every minute or 
nearly 8 years of content per day. Users’ demands for a fast, 
secure, reliable, all-inclusive, trustworthy and general-purpose 
Web are uncontrollable. In 2010, the top 10 Web sites accounted 
for about 75 percent of all US traffic, compared to the 31% in 
2001. Business controversies on issues like the monetization of 
links and excessive market power in searching and mobile 
applications are coming to the fore, whilst novel business models 
are changing the market rules (e.g. peer production, 
crowdfunding). Some executives and interest groups are still 
trying to conquer the Web by limiting the freedom to connect and 
update its content. Controversies have been also transferred to the 
legal battlefields. Contentious legal initiatives (e.g. SOPA) are 
causing both small and gigantic power games among 
governments, industries and non-governmental organizations. 
Concerns about identity, privacy and security are more often in 
the headlines. Although technically right solutions exist, these are 
have not been adopted yet (e.g. PKI, P3P, eID). HTML5 seems to 
gain interest well beyond technological outsets, and Open Data 
initiatives are revolutionizing science, business and government. 
Diverse debates and discussions are indirectly or directly 
connected to the Web ecosystem and outspread across the social 
discourse. Symbolically, all these issues are gathered under the 
rhetoric of online access as an emerging universal human right. 
Lately, national constitutions have started to incorporate it as a 
basic right (e.g. Norway). Internet and Web pioneers share 
different views on the issue, thus driving a creative dialogue about 
our live with the Web. This dialogue has raised, in various 
different ways and on as many different occasions, the following 
question: what kind of Web is more beneficial for society? Surely, 
as the transformational impact of the Web across society grows, 
the pressure to define its technological principles and the 
underlying moral values will escalate. Otherwise, we run the risk 
of ending up with a restrained, fragmented and autistic Web.  
2. THE NEED FOR WEB ETHICS   
Generic questions about Web’s transformational potential have 
been brought into the agenda of many disciplines. Philosophical 
thinking and engineering should be in the front line by forming 
the main questions and setting the research framework. On this 
campaign single-sided analysis (i.e. technological or social) is not 
sufficient to tackle these complex and multifarious issues. 
Domain-specific analysis should be orchestrated by more generic 
approaches, expanding the solution range. Having defined 
existence, time and space in the Web [36], the next relevant quest 
is to consider its moral aspects.  
Ethics is the branch of philosophy that deals with the study of 
good and evil. Its fundamental questions are often repeated 
through time, adaptive to the historical and social conditions. 
These fundamental questions include the definition of good and 
evil, the relation between morality and truth, the limits of freedom 
of will, the definition of right and wrong etc. Applied ethics is the 
branch of philosophy concerning the application of ethics to 
specific problems or classes of problems. From 1960’s till today 
the field of applied ethics has seen remarkable growth. Business 
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ethics, biomedical ethics, computer ethics, animal rights and 
environmental ethics are some of the most active areas in modern 
applied ethics [21]. The Vietnam War, the great progress in 
technology, the wide spread of drugs and contraceptives, the 
degradation of the environment, have raised a series of questions 
that could not be answered by traditional theories of ethics. An 
important contribution of applied ethics to the field of law is “A 
Theory of Justice” [33]. Computer ethics is the branch of applied 
ethics, which examines the social and ethical impact of 
information technology [18, 23]. More particularly, it focuses on 
the social impact that information technology has on our lives, the 
nature of such impact, and the utilization of technology in an 
ethical manner. Examples include issues related to the cybercrime, 
the protection of privacy, copyright and patents, the digital divide, 
and the use of computers in the workplace. The variety of 
technological applications creates new and unexpected situations 
and possibilities, thus causing new ethical dilemmas and values to 
emerge. For example, protection of personal data by electronic 
devices is of particular relevance to our society - to remember that 
only fifteen years ago the relative sensitivity was rudimentary. 
Lately, information ethics [12, 13] shed new light on many 
traditional ethical issues in computing.  
The last twenty years there is a growing literature on the study of 
the ethics of the cyberspace encompassing all kinds of interactions 
among Users and the Internet [14, 31, 35]. Indicative topics 
include the ethics of blogging, free Speech and anonymity, 
pornography, censorship, intellectual property, privacy and 
regulation, spam and advertising, Internet as a medium of 
communication, accountability and trust, hacking, and the Internet 
access as a basic human right.  
The Web has been built on the Internet stack, enabling the inter-
linkage of digital beings. Despite the fact that it shares some 
common characteristics with its underlying technologies, creates a 
new feasibility and actuality space. The Web is sufficiently 
unusual, transformative and necessary to human existence, and as 
such it requires more systematic philosophical thinking to 
describe its ethically-relevant properties [28]. Initial motivation 
behind the development of the Web was based on ethical 
principles like esteem, pride, excellence, absence of guilt, 
rewards, and indignation [28]. Originally it was more a closed 
“Aristotelian world” than a space governed by rules, roles, 
hierarchies and deliverables. We believe that the above-mentioned 
virtues are the core driving forces of its exponential impact. These 
classic values that inspired the inventor and early Web Users and 
supported its massive dissemination, have now become more 
specific in practice. For instance, the discussion about freedom of 
expression incorporates the issue of Net Neutrality and self-
determination that is connected to the privacy of online data.  
One of the first questions for Web ethics should be a more 
comprehensive identification of the values that motivated its 
creation. An open conjecture in this line of inquiry has to do with 
the question whether different magmas of values and code could 
initiate similar decentralized information systems. Another 
question is how these evolving values affect the impact of Web in 
diverse social contexts and under what sort of prerequisites they 
can be sustainable.  
It is now the time for scholars to look deep in the heart of the Web 
creation, to propose and engineer perspicacious solutions that will 
benefit the entire society. The quest for new requirements should 
directly address the needs, and promote human values. Web ethics 
should be thoroughly investigated in order to become a handy 
compass for Users, entrepreneurs and governments to direct their 
decisions towards prosperous ways.  
3. INTERNAL WEB ETHICS 
Web has been evolved from a piece of software code to a 
dynamical ecosystem of Users and multi-purpose functionalities. 
Despite its profound importance, Web ethics is still an unexplored 
research field. As such, it requires systematic research by 
determined experts.  
The core of our methodology consists of two parts, firstly, the 
historical evolution of the Web and, secondly, a three-leveled 
approach thereof as this will be introduced below. The Web in its 
early stages was meant to address mainly technological needs, 
such as an interlinked bulleting board with low levels of 
interaction. In subsequent years, though, the Web evolved and 
became a construct of multiple interlocking contexts, and was 
even used to enable financial transactions. Users not only post and 
link digital content, but also communicate, comment, work, 
advertise, exchange information and physical goods in and 
through the Web. The social aspects of the Web are fashioned as 
the ability to create contexts, and an important part of them, 
economic contexts. Intense social and economic online 
transactions result into a dynamic magma of values and code. This 
fundamental standard implies that Web ethics should be studied 
under the assumption of inherent codependence between User and 
System (or equivalently Actor and Network [22]). Also, a sound 
definition regarding existence, time and space is necessary to 
describe the moral values tied to the Web as a system [36] In 
order to focus on our the methodology we propose in this paper, 
we assume that the Web is the only system existing in the 
universe (“manna from heaven” hypothesis”). Let us call this 
methodology the internal Web ethics analysis. Our approach 
extents the Web science perspective, which investigates the Web 
as a self-standing techno-social artifact [5, 38]. 
3.1 Magma of Users and code 
Till the mass dissemination of Web 2.0, the main point in the 
ethics of computation took for granted that there was clear 
distinction between the technological and the social 
methodologies analyzing related phenomena. Technology was 
considered an autonomous force that changed society, and its 
methodology had a simple cause/effect form (technological 
determinism). Others believe the opposite, i.e., society is an 
autonomous force that changes technology (social determinism).  
Web 2.0 created a de facto indissoluble magma of Code and Users 
(techno-social evolution). Hence, the classic technology-society 
division is irrelevant in capturing the essence of the active User 
participation. The evolving interdependence between Code and 
Users can be addressed by models, which are built on the co-
dependence of human moral values and engineering principles.  
3.2 Being, time and space in the Web  
Applied ethics methodologies refer to well-defined application 
domains. We believe that for the purposes of Web ethics a 
suitable framework is the definition of Web space [36]. A theory 
about existence in time and space is necessary to frame a tractable 
approach for the moral analysis of the Web. In [36] it has been 
proposed a notion of existence in the Web, based on a pragmatic 
definition of Being in general: “a Being exists if and only if there 
is a communication channel linking to it”. Being in the Web 
implies that the communication channel is concrete, identifiable 
and visible. Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is the most 
profound and stable technology about creating communication 
channels in the Web. It requires the minimal description of 
invariant elements in communication through the Web and acts 
like the “fingerprint” of the Web Being because it is directly 
connected to existence (birth, access, navigate, edit and death). 
Thus, a Web Being is defined as follows: “Web beings are defined 
to be Beings that can be communicated through the Web.”. The 
source of value for Web Beings is concentrated on how digitality 
is mutated by the linking potential, enabling them to be anywhere, 
at anytime. Users are “potential” owners of every Web Being, in 
the sense that the Being may not reside in the hardware but can be 
downloaded almost instantly. This expansion of the concept of 
existence is captured by the concept of virtualization, which 
describes the augmented potentialities of Web Being as a digital 
and distributable unity. The Web Space could be considered as a 
division of position and place of online content, created by the 
links among the Web Beings. Each Web Being is occupying a 
specific locus in the Web network. Identification in the Web 
Space is given by the URI namespace. Location is specified by a 
triplet of URIs, namely the URIs of the Web Being and the 
incoming and outgoing links. These links provide orientation by 
acting as a three-dimensional “geographic coordinate system” in 
the Web. The act of creation or deletion of a Web Being or a link, 
alters the Web Space. Hence, the evolving Web Space is fully 
describable by the lifetime processes of Web Beings and links. 
Except for the “book-keeping” clock time defined in Physics, time 
could be a series of choices in space. Web time is a series of 
choices (visits) in the Web Space that can be defined as 
Bergsonian durations, since visiting selections attach meaning and 
define casual relationships among Web Beings. This approach of 
time as duration is characterized by indeterminism, heterogeneity 
and irreversibility. In the Web, durations are becoming 
discoverable, observable, traceable, able to process and massive.  
3.3 The “manna from heaven”  
The study of codependence among Code and Users is really 
complicated. Initially, we suggest that on the first level the Web 
can be studied as the only existing system in the world. Human 
beings are communicating and working solely through and with 
the Web. Α compassionate ‘God’ provides the necessary quantity 
of ‘manna’, fulfilling all human needs, with no cost and effort. 
This strong and unrealistic assumption will help us to comprehend 
bottom to top the moral values and their inter-connections to the 
complex actualities of the engineering principles. The analytical 
outcome of the first level will prepare us to study the effects of the 
Web in the entire human society. A characteristic domain of 
application of this assumption can be Net Neutrality issues. It will 
include the comparative analysis between established and 
emerging of new theories in the social, technological and 
economic domain. Analyzing the internal Web ethics at the first 
level will provide us with the necessary insights about neutrality 
as the interplay of core values and the engineering of the Web. 
3.4 Technology, context and economy  
The Web can be analyzed on three levels: the technological, the 
contextual and the economic, since they reflect its historical 
evolution from plain software to living ecosystem. The Web 
technology is built on the Internet, resulting huge amounts of data 
created by billions of Users (technology level). On top of this 
software, various new contexts have expanded initial 
functionalities. Context, being a set of tasks or a general 
framework of attitudes, enables Users to extent the range of 
information exchange and collaborative action, mainly through 
trust mechanisms (context level). The establishment of beliefs and 
attitudes regarding the trustworthiness of Users and associated 
Web Beings enabled the emergence of business models that are 
based on exchanges – financial or other – among Users (economic 
level).   
Note here a point made by [30] who argues the importance of the 
distinction between trustworthiness/trust and reliability/reliance. 
He locates the distinction in the nature of the interactions between 
trustor and trustee. Where the interactions are ‘static’, we merely 
have a case of reliance (as someone may rely on a bridge that has 
been well-built, or on a clock that is correct). The emergence of 
trust out of reliance is an important signal for the move up from 
the technology level. 
For Pettit, trust only comes when the interaction is interactively 
dynamic – i.e. trustworthy agents understand they are trusted, and 
trust gives them additional motive for behaving in a trustworthy 
manner. He argues on this basis that trust over the Internet (and 
ipso facto the Web) is impossible without supporting offline 
relationships and information, and therefore impossible on the 
‘manna from heaven’ assumption discussed above. The reason for 
Pettit’s rejection of trust as a possibility in this context is the 
fluidity of identity online – how could a trustor come to believe 
that a virtual contact fulfilled the requirements for interactive 
dynamism? 
Without getting too deeply into this issue, [25] moves the focus 
for trustworthiness away from the trustee’s attitude to the trustor, 
and toward the claims about her intentions, capacities and 
motivations the trustee makes. In particular, it is an attractive 
suggestion that the shift from reliability to trustworthiness 
happens as these claims become less deterministic, more implicit 
and less precise. There is no exact borderline or tipping point, but 
this conveys the importance of the agency and the choice for the 
trustee. 
3.5 Hayek’s theory of freedom 
According to [17], “liberty” or “freedom” is defined to be the 
absence of coercion of some humans by other humans. This does 
not mean that one has unlimited options including all physical 
potentialities of the world. Likewise, it does not account for the 
internal states of being and any metaphysical notion of freedom or 
power. The main focus is on the mitigation of coercion as a set of 
restraints or constraints to human will, imposed by others. As 
Hayek explains (p.133), “Coercion occurs when one man’s 
actions are made to serve another man’s will, not for his own but 
for the other's purpose. It is not that the coerced does not choose 
at all; if that were the case, we should not speak of his “acting.” 
Similarly, Hayek defines important facets of coercion like 
deception and fraud, as forms of controlling the information upon 
which a human counts; this information makes a human do what 
the deceiver wants him to do. Despite the fact that coercion 
suggests both the threat of inflicting harms and the intention 
thereby to cause certain outcomes, it does not necessarily involves 
all influences that humans can exercise upon the acting of others 
and acquire full control of the environment. Coercion is 
undesirable because it “prevents a person from using his mental 
powers to the full and consequently from making the greatest 
contribution that he is capable of to the community.” (p.134). On 
the contrary, freedom is desirable “because every individual 
knows so little and, in particular, because we rarely know which 
of us knows best that we trust the independent and competitive 
efforts of many to induce the emergence of what we shall want 
when we see it.” (p.29). It is freedom that releases the 
unforeseeable and unpredictable; these little accidents in human 
behavior, which are so vital for innovation. As Hayek argues 
(p.31) “lt is because we do not know how individuals will use 
their freedom that it is so important.” and “Freedom granted only 
when it is known beforehand that its effects will be beneficial is 
not freedom.” These accidents are the resultant of knowledge and 
attitudes, skills and habits, formed by human interaction and, in 
most cases, they do not simply occur but evolve. In order to 
flourish they must be supported by the existence of 
complementary concepts like some personal sphere, property, 
state, rules, competition and responsibility. The emergence of 
personal sphere and property assists individuals to avoid coercion 
from others. The only means to prevent coercion is the potential 
threat tied to coercion. States typically monopolize coercive 
power. In free societies, the State exercises minimal enforcement 
of coercive power, which nurtures individual creativity and 
competitive markets based on just distribution of property and 
responsible individual behavior. Particularly, “Since coercion is 
the control of the essential data of an individual’s action by 
another, it can be prevented only by enabling the individual to 
secure for himself some private sphere where he is protected 
against such interference. … It is here that coercion of one 
individual by another can be prevented only by the threat of 
coercion assured free sphere.” (p.139). The acquisition of 
property is the first step towards the limitation of personal sphere 
and against coercive action. The next steps include the initiation 
of general rules governing the conditions under which behaviors 
and attitudes become part of such individual spheres (it is clear 
that carefully-crafted data protection rules are vital for both steps, 
which makes the lack of cooperation, or even of an agreed 
framework, between the EU and the US, not to mention India and 
China, all the more disturbing). It is crucial to ensure that the 
range and content of these rules is not determined by the 
deliberate assignment of particular things to particular persons. 
“The decisive condition for mutually advantageous collaboration 
between people, based on voluntary consent rather than coercion, 
is that there be many people who can serve one’s needs, so that 
nobody has to be dependent on specific persons for the essential 
conditions of life or the possibility of development in some 
direction. It is competition made possible by the dispersion of 
property that deprives the individual owners of particular things 
of all coercive powers.” (p.141). The degree of freedom in a 
society is directly related to the minimal enforcement of coercive 
power by the state according to general and no discriminative 
rules and the safeguarding of competitive market conditions. 
Competition as the existence of an efficient number of alternative 
offers is fundamental in the case of providing life-critical services. 
Generally, “whenever there is a danger of a monopolist’s 
acquiring coercive power, the most expedient and effective 
method of preventing this is probably to require him to treat all 
customers alike, i.e., to insist that his prices be the same for all 
and to prohibit all discrimination on his part. This is the same 
principle by which we have learned to curb the coercive power of 
the state.” (p.136). Having argued about the strategic role of state 
in minimizing coercion does not connotes that individuals enjoy 
only the opportunity and the burden of choice; it also highlights 
that individuals must accept the consequences of their choices and 
the resulting approbation or censure for them. In a free society 
freedom and responsibility should be interlocked. 
4. THE WEB AS A SPACE OF FREEDOM 
For many philosophers, freedom is not just one of the values but 
constitutes the source and prescribes the conditions of most moral 
values [3]. Hence, a theory about freedom is necessary in order to 
explore the internal Web ethics. In the present article, Hayek’s 
analysis about freedom is adapted because is adequately 
consonant to the main architectural principles of the Web artifact, 
namely: lack of central authority, openness, variety of choices, 
distributed empowerment of individuals and liberal underpinning. 
Hayek’s approach is not the only theory of freedom that can be 
used to analyze Web ethics. Its clarity and generality enable us to 
build a starting point that will be extended and refined with other 
theories to capture the ethical aspects of the Web. 
Freedom creates more options to solve problems collectively and 
to innovate, but some of these options may be used in ways that 
cause coercion (“freedom-coercion” tradeoff). Thus, the question 
enveloping each theory is how to construct a system that selects, 
with minimum social cost which positive options to sacrifice in 
order to minimize coercion (or the dual problem). Hayek’s 
approach could be considered to offer one of the systematic 
answers in this question. In particular, his theory is briefly 
transcribed as follows:     
o State posses the monopoly to enforce coercive power through 
General Rules. 
o Personal Sphere and Property counterweight state power.  
o General Rules are enforced equally and describe the 
borderlines between state and Personal Sphere.   
o Property is a basic realization of General Rules.  
o Competition is possible by the dispersion of Property. 
o Mutually advantageous collaboration is based on 
Competition in service provision.  
o An effective anti-monopolistic policy is to require from the 
monopolist (including the state) to treat all customers alike. 
o Individuals should be responsible and accountable for their 
actions. 
 
In the following Subsections we consider some “freedom-
coercion” tradeoffs on three levels of abstraction (technology, 
context, economy) according to Hayek’s conceptualizations, in 
order to gradually build a set of important issues about living with 
the Web.  
4.1 The Technological Web 
The Web is an engineered artifact, not some natural phenomenon. 
It has been created as an Internet application and its building 
blocks are crafted in software code. In this sense, technological 
underpinnings are vital for its existence.  
4.1.1 Internet infrastructure  
Internet has been evolved from communication architecture for 
computers to generative system for innovative software, basically 
because it was built on simple principles that transfer the power of 
choice to equally trusted single Users. The absence of central gate 
keeping and the unprecedented decentralized power in action is 
coming with two major costs: (a) inefficient personal identity 
management and thus, lack of security and (b) not guaranteed 
quality of transmission.  
The notion of Internet freedom is related to the free access and 
inter-connection of any compatible software code developed by 
Users over the Internet network. Coercive powers are mainly 
arising due to badware applications (e.g. computer-zombies), 
traffic censorship (e.g. “Snooping” - accessing information within 
Internet packets [4]) and inadequate quality of transmission. 
Personal sphere for Internet Users is described by their IP address 
whenever they are connected to Internet. IP addresses are traffic 
data that can only be processed for certain reasons (e.g. 
payments). Ordinarily, they are considered by Data Protection 
Authorities and courts to be personal data, despite the fact that 
courts in some countries (e.g. France) have reached conflicting 
decisions [20].  
O’Hara has argued that the revolutionary aspect of the World 
Wide Web is that it is a decentralised information structure. This 
democratic decentralisation is a key factor in the added value that 
the Web provides, because it facilitates the serendipitous reuse of 
information in new and unanticipated contexts. However its basic 
principle, of free flow of information packets and a very simple 
set of rules and standards underpinning these complex structures, 
is being undermined by attempts to restrict information flow. As 
use of the Web has spread, illiberal regimes feel threatened, but 
thanks to the hands-off approach of the 1990s, there are no 
affirmative globally-recognised principles governing the flow of 
information online. Currently, China is still focusing on a 
censorship-based approach to information control, using methods 
in direct opposition to the Web’s essential governing principle of 
decentralisation. The liberalism of the Web has two distinct 
levels: first, the free flow of information and unrestricted linking 
helps make the valuable network; secondly the engineering 
principles of the Web facilitate the efficient flow of information 
and enables the basic structure to attain balance. In this way, 
ethical principles (and a strong stand on a political dispute) 
influence directly even Web infrastructure [26]. 
4.1.2 The case of Net Neutrality (NN) 
The definition of NN and its technical consequences as Internet 
traffic subject to no hindrances could be further elaborated by 
using Hayek’s ideas. The “first-come first-served” model with no 
other restriction is extended to Quality of Service (QoS) 
discrimination as long as there are no special and exclusive 
contracts at work (limited discrimination and QoS). Hence, in the 
one hand, no one may have exclusivity to end points, but on the 
other hand, anyone can pay to have higher QoS in its end point. 
Alternatively, limited discrimination without QoS tiering can be 
applied. According to some lawmakers in the US, QoS 
discrimination is allowed, subject to no particular charge for 
higher-quality service [10]. The underlying technical challenge is 
to engineer solutions that ensure NN in combination with higher 
QoS. This can be achieved by designing Internet infrastructure 
that allows for implicit traffic differentiation and prioritization of 
a select traffic, but without any kind of User, network operator or 
ISP intervention. Such a proposal, which involves an implicit kind 
of datagram separation rather than an a-priori explicit flow 
prioritization, is called FAN (Flow-Aware Networking) [19, 34].  
FAN may ensure neutrality along with the awareness of QoS [9]. 
This is because it does not aim to explicitly categorize data flows 
in distinct classes (e.g. premium, basic), but only to create an 
occurrence, upon which the implicit separation will be performed 
solely based on the current link status (e.g. dataflow congestion, 
traffic bottleneck etc.). Therefore, all datagrams are forwarded 
unconditionally in the pipeline, but they are also “equal”, subject 
to be separated or even dropped when the network tolerance 
demands it. The main advantage of FAN-based architectures is 
that they differentiate the data flow, taking into account only the 
traffic characteristics of the currently transmitted information. 
Hence, apart from data discrimination, it is not possible to 
comprehensively discriminate certain applications, services and 
end-Users. Such NN-QoS symbiosis does not violate NN and data 
discrimination principles. It however demands a global 
implementation approach in infrastructure level, involving 
common standards in prediction and limitation mechanisms for 
controlling the quality of transmitted information in the pipeline. 
The limitation mechanisms may provide a sudden separation of 
flow, but the decision should be made upon specific network 
tolerance metrics rather than individual properties of specific 
flows, such as “who” sends/receives a specific “class” of 
information. 
4.1.3 The Web software 
The notion of freedom in the Web software is to freely navigate, 
create and update Web Beings and links. Its cornerstones are 
universality, openness and separation of layers in engineering, 
editing, searching and navigating. [4] argues that “Keeping the 
web universal and keeping its standards open help people invent 
new services.” Coercive powers can be directly injected into the 
network by Internet infrastructure (e.g. NN). Badware-infected 
Web Beings [41], central control and censoring of Web traffic are 
main sources of internal coercion in the Web. The emergence of 
“walled gardens” in cabled TV and Social Networks [4, 41]  are 
based on isolated or malformed (i.e. without exclusive or open 
URI) Web Beings that strengthen coercive potential through 
privacy threats and fragmentation. Furthermore, any effort to 
manipulate for own benefit the results of indexing and searching 
processes (e.g. spamdexing [24]) is a form of coercion because it 
distorts searcheability and navigation. 
Navigation in the Web space results in traffic. Web traffic is 
recorded in the Web Being’s log file. Actually, this is the first 
time that humanity has introduced a universal event log in such a 
stratified and heterogeneous system. The resulting log file is under 
common ownership by design. Both the Editor who administers 
and updates the particular Web Being and the Navigator, who 
visits it, share the same information about this event. Although, 
the Editor has direct access to the log file residing in the Web 
server, the Navigator should install particular software to process 
the source file of his visiting history. Thus, this log file is the core 
architectural element that manifests the co-operative nature of the 
Web artifact and should be further analyzed. For the moment, 
legal and illegal cookies are censoring our moves with or without 
our consent [1] and “toolbar” applications exchange their services 
for recording all our navigation history.  
During the first Web era, the majority of Users were Navigators 
and just a small portion of them was editing the Web. At the 
current Web 2.0 era, 70% of Users are both Navigators and 
Editors, who can easily edit, interconnect, aggregate and comment 
upon text, images and video. The underlying structure of the Web 
graph is characterized by four major characteristics: 1) on-line 
property (the number of Web Beings and links changes with 
time), 2) power law degree distribution with exponent higher than 
two, 3) small world property (the diameter is much smaller than 
the order of the graph) and 4) many dense bipartite sub-graphs [6]. 
In order for the Web to be an advantageous multi-purpose space, 
it should consist of a critical mass of Web Beings and links in an 
appropriate structure to facilitate navigation. Intuitively, it should 
be connected, not fragmented, to ease navigation from any Web 
Being to the entire network. The analysis of the interplay among 
functions, subsequent structures and moral values is an open 
question for internal Web ethics.  
Treating all Navigators equally is an engineering principle. It is 
violated (or enriched) by profile customization. Treating all 
Editors alike is achieved through open technological standards 
developed by independent bodies (e.g. W3C). Public and private 
contribution to these institutions is necessary to sustain open and 
effective standards. Apart from the first class principles of 
universality, openness and separation, “quality-related” issues 
could be relevant to Web freedom if navigation and searching is 
severely degraded. Despite the fact that the explosion of bits in 
Web 2.0 increased the number of available Web Beings, 
incommoded the discovery of meaningful answers. This overload 
of unstructured content is partially tackled by Search Engines. 
Semantically structured data (aka Web 3.0) are engineered to 
anticipate it through machine-processable meaningful reasoning. 
The quality of content also includes factors like diversity, 
credibility, accuracy and informativeness of online content and 
stability of links.    
4.2 The Contextualized Web 
The Web became a techno-social space for innovation and inter-
creativity because it has been transformed from a bulletin board to 
a context-aware system. It is not only the number of options the 
Web is providing, but also it is the quality and the usefulness of 
these options that matters. The Web context emerges as a bridge 
in the traditional public-private dichotomy. The privatized (or 
publicized) space arises between the private realm of intimacy and 
individualism and the public realm of citizenship and active 
participation for the societal good [29]. On the contrary, in the 
industrial economy, where consumers are mainly exercising the 
right to use resources, Web Users exercise the full range of 
property rights, namely: (1) to use, (2) to form, modify and 
substantiate (3) to benefit from use and (4) to transfer Web 
Beings. 
Context, as a set of tasks or general framework of roles and 
attitudes, enables Users to extent the range of information 
exchange and collaborative action, mainly through trust 
mechanisms. For instance, in Web 2.0, what Users create is not 
simply content (e.g. reviews) but context. This new contextual 
framework emerges through the aggregation and collaborative 
filtering of personal preferences in massive scale [39]. More 
importantly, it facilitates connected Users to search and navigate 
the complex Web more effectively, amplifying incentives for 
quality. Of course, there are many open issues to be solved such 
as the fashioning of more effective forms of online identities and 
trusting processes. According to [25], trust is an attitude toward 
the trustworthiness of an agent. In our Web-only hypothetical 
world (“manna from heaven” assumption), agents are the Users 
who control specific Web Beings. Representations, intentions, 
capacities, motivations and contexts are established and expressed 
exclusively by Web technologies. Hence, freedom in the 
contextualized Web is to establish specific contexts in order to 
form beliefs and attitudes that some Users and their underlying 
Web beings are trustworthy. Coercive powers can arise from un-
trustworthy technologies and governments, social hacking, 
badware and malicious representations.  
However, it is also important to take account of the bad forms that 
trust can take [2]. The links between coercion and trust are 
sometimes uncomfortably close. Note, for example, that when 
[16] describes his theory of encapsulated trust informed by 
rational-choice ideas in social science, he argues that “I trust 
someone if I have reason to believe it will be in that person’s 
interest to be trustworthy in the relevant way at the relevant time 
… [and if that person] counts my interests as partly his or her 
own interests just because they are my interests” (p.19). What 
strikes the reader is how close this definition of trust is to Hayek’s 
definition of coercion quoted earlier. 
This brings in Baier’s notion of antitrust [2], where trust is 
harmful to the society at large. In this case the focus is on areas 
where trust shades into coercion, but it is clear that there are other 
spheres of life where freedom undermines trust, or allows 
corrosive examples of trust to emerge – cybercrime is an obvious 
example, where trust among criminals is essential to prevent 
police infiltration, and where trust among Web users is exploited 
by criminals. Baier’s expressibility test [2] (pp.123-124) asserts 
that a trust relation is morally acceptable provided that the trustee 
may express her motives truthfully; this is an important insight, 
but it must be vulnerable to Pettit’s worry that such expression, in 
the world we are envisaging, could only be mediated by Web 
technologies. 
Nevertheless, communication is central to establishing trust, as 
Habermas argued [15], and so the rich connectivity of the Web is 
bound into its function. Antitrust and coercion may well be prices 
we have to pay for widespread and beneficial trust (repeating 
Hayek’s point that freedom may at all times produce bad 
outcomes). The point of a Web ethics is to try to ensure not that 
antitrust happens, but that it is outweighed by beneficial trust to as 
great a degree as possible consistent with Hayekian notions of 
freedom. 
4.3 The Economic Web 
Most needs are better fulfilled through collective effort. In 
practice, incentives, capabilities, preferences and realizations of 
effort are heterogeneous and difficult to be synchronized. A 
powerful metaphor to achieve synchronization is setting efforts 
and the products of them under a common valuation scheme, a 
uniform numeraire. This numeraire is money, supported by a set 
of institutions and practices (e.g. the market). It is far beyond the 
scope of this paper to analyze related economic theory. We limit 
ourselves to the reassurance that economizing a system is an 
important factor for its viability, usability and development. The 
issues posed in preceding layers could be viewed through the 
economic aspect (e.g. NN as two-sided pricing [11]). The question 
is how the above-mentioned freedoms can be efficiently 
engineered and disseminated across Users in particular techno-
social contexts.  
The Web has not emerged as a business project with hierarchical 
structures. It has been crafted as a creative and open space of 
volunteers, predominantly outside traditional market and pricing 
systems. In our point of view, markets would have never invested 
such amounts in labor costs to develop this gigantic system. But to 
be fair, market mechanisms provided the necessary motives and 
tools to initiate a high-risk idea like Web. Furthermore, the lack of 
direct compensation and the temporal disconnection between 
effort and rewards are the shared characteristics among Peer, 
Procurement and Patronage production models. In the Web, Peer 
production has been established as a basic form of production, 
extending David’s taxonomy [7] with the fourth P [37] .  
The explosion of Web Users occurred as a result of symbiosis 
between non-financial and financial incentives [37]. Accordingly, 
freedom in the economic Web pertains to the removal of any 
possible barrier to economize. Each User should be allowed to 
apply any business models. Apart from the preceding levels, 
coercive powers are coming from two economy-related sources: 
the concentration of power in a minority of Web Beings and Users 
and the inability of some Users to benefit from the Web economy. 
As the economic Web grows, state faces unprecedented and 
complex trade-offs between private interest and social welfare. 
Three of those are referred as the “Link economy”, the “App 
economy” and the excessive market power in Search Engine 
market. Recently, the formation of links, a fundamental 
characteristic of the Web, became the center of business 
controversies. As traditional content creators (e.g. TV) are losing 
a large part of their revenue streams from User-Generated 
substitutes (e.g. micro-blogs), the need for the institution of 
regulation issues in free reference linking appears. On the other 
hand, it is argued that Search Engines create exploitable traffic for 
content creators and that all online content must be open, with 
permanent links, so that it may receive in-links, since links are a 
key to securing efficiency in creating and finding information. 
However, the economic implications of reference links on 
attention and revenue have not been analyzed yet, despite their 
influence over consumer’s utility, competition and social welfare. 
[8] concluded that: “link equilibria often do not form, even though 
their formation can lead to higher aggregate profits and better 
content. This, in the view of the authors constitutes a negative 
side-effect of the culture of “free” links that currently pervades 
the web…”  
Despite the fact that Web 2.0 multiplied the pool of Users and 
content, the direct use of Web technologies has become shallower. 
Contrastingly to early stages of Web’s inception, modern Users 
are mainly using the Web through established services (e.g. 
Search Engine, Social Network) and not directly, for instance, by 
creating their homepage or concentrating and controlling personal 
data in a privately owned domain. [4] reasons that the tendency 
for some companies to develop native applications for specific 
devices (e.g. “app stores”) instead of Web applications sterilizes 
and fragments the Web. [32] demonstrates that the already large 
levels of concentration in the Web search market are likely to 
continue. He argues that since the market mechanism cannot 
provide socially optimal quality levels, there is space for 
regulatory engagements which may involve the funding of basic 
R&D in Web search, or more drastic measures like the division of 
Search Engines into “software” and “service” parts. It seems that 
massive use is coming with the cost of centralization of both 
traffic and data control. The balance point between innovation 
coming from large Web companies and innovation from single 
Users or voluntary groups should be thoroughly examined. In our 
point of view, this fast evolving centralization is directly against 
the core values of the Web ecosystem and must be addressed in 
the direction of transferring back to individual User part of data 
control. This can be achieved through technologies and business 
practices that are transparently enabling the User to process and 
economize personal data. In this campaign, the primer difficulties 
arising from the fact that now the Web is partly governed by 
economic forces and traditional institutions, which are 
characterized by irrelevant or conflicting moral principles. 
Therefore, one of the fundamental issues for Web ethics is to put 
this debate to the foreground through the employment of concrete 
architectural and policy structures (for example, with reference to 
the conditions, formats and licenses under which Public Sector 
Information for reuse is made available to citizens).  
5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We believe that the Web engineering principles are ethically-
relevant and they should be systematically analyzed as such, in 
order to realize their potential in promoting human values. Web 
ethics raises the question about what could be a better future with 
the Web and how we can engineer it. As an emerging field of 
applied ethics, it discerns the core values of Web’s inception and 
their evolution process in diverse social contexts. Our main 
arguments are based on the codependence of code and values. The 
Web is seen as a new form of existence [36] and it is assumed that 
it is the only existing system. The proposed methodology 
gradually analyzes the Web’s complex reality by enriching 
underlying technology with human behavior aspects. Our three-
levels analysis (technology, context and economy) reflects the 
historical evolution of the Web from software to a social 
ecosystem. As the concept of freedom is a prerequisite of most of 
the moral values, we introduce our methodology on internal Web 
ethics by demonstrating Hayek’s theory of freedom in the three-
levels analysis of the Web. We choose Hayek’s approach because 
it reflects nicely the codependence among the architectural 
engineering principles of the Web and moral values. This 
correspondence can be summarized as follows: 
o centralization of traffic and data control, rights on visiting 
log file, custom User profiles and interplay among functions, 
structures and moral values are directly connected to the 
quality of freedom in the Web,  
o issues about freedom in lower levels of the Web ecosystem 
(i.e. technology) have crucial impact on the subsequent levels 
of higher complexity (i.e. context, economy) and  
o generic freedom-coercion trade-offs are useful in framing the 
feasibility space but incomplete in treating more specific 
cases in practice (e.g. NN). 
As the Web grows, it becomes essential to balance the need for 
efficient efforts and the stimulus for more competitors in creating 
and economizing content and search provision. A basic 
prerequisite in this effort is to identify and engineer its core moral 
values in order to account for an extensive range of User 
functionalities and pervasiveness in social discourse. This ongoing 
work can be further inspired by philosophical theories and historic 
periods [27] (pp.207-209). Also, it will be placed and compared 
with regards to relevant research about the interplay between 
technology and society. Providing deeper insights in Web ethics 
requires the supplementary specification of the suggested model 
with sound theoretical foundations and more realistic 
assumptions. Therefore, the next steps should include the 
enrichment of contextualized Web with theories and technologies 
about identity, privacy and trust. The study of the ethics of the 
economic Web should be extended to the study of inequality and 
distribution theories and detailed business models. During the 
next phase of this research project, the “manna from heaven” 
assumption will be relaxed and the three-levels model will be 
augmented by a fourth level to capture Web’s interaction with 
other real systems. At a latter stage the Web ethics should be able 
to address more pragmatic questions like: “Can the Web protect 
itself as a liberal society? How do we manage online identities 
ethically? How can I deal fairly with people if I don’t know their 
expectations? If I don’t even know they are people? ” [28]. How 
the Web’s function, structure and evolution are affected by ethics?  
The Web is a unique piece of technology not only because of its 
breakthrough technological innovation, but mainly because it 
provides a new basis for expressing human creativity, and reveals 
“inactive” parts of human nature. Apart from understanding its 
morality, it is an inspiring challenge to transfuse the essence of 
our experience and the values of the Web to reassess concepts like 
freedom, choice, participation, inequality and development. We 
agree with [40] that “It is not just information that must be free, 
but the knowledge of how to use it. The test of a free society is not 
the liberty to consume information, nor to produce it, nor even to 
implement its potential in private world of one’s choosing. The 
test of a free society is the liberty for the collective transformation 
of the world through abstractions freely chosen and freely 
actualised.” The role of Web ethics could be to elaborate and 
specify the motives and engineering of this new version of utopia.     
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ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we propose to investigate three main social 
ontological schools – practice theory, assemblages theories and 
actor-network theory – to focus on the assemblage theory, and to 
clarify social ontology underlying the last one, for finally 
discussing its contribution in the debate on the philosophies of 
the (social)Web, in order to specify what social ontology for 
social web.  
Keywords 
Social ontology, assemblage theory, actor-network theory, 
practice theory, social web. 
1. WHAT IS SOCIAL ONTOLOGY? 
Online social interactions form the basis of much online activity 
including all what is actually important for people: expression of 
self, social networking, citizen participation, content sharing or, 
more concretely, all practical aspects of everyday life (online 
shopping, traveling, health, education, sport, jobs, religion…). 
As we referred more and more often to the Web as the social 
Web and more explicitly as a set of social relations that link 
people through the World Wide Web [1] it becomes necessary 
to go more thoroughly into what “social” is.  
If we except the two main theoretical traditions in Social 
science, as Giddens [2] coins them - holist or objectivist theories 
like functionalism, systems theory and structuralism on one side, 
individualist or subjectivist theories like hermeneutic and the 
many interpretative theories (including rational action theory 
which must be treated separately, i.e. Coleman [3]) on the other 
side – the eighties are characterized by some attempt of 
overcoming the antinomies between ‘action’ (or agency) and 
‘structure’, which existed in both sociological and philosophical 
literature. The notions of agency and structure presuppose one 
another and social theorists proposed different 
conceptualizations from the relation of the actor to the system 
which transcend this opposition. The new object of the social 
sciences becomes something which “stands in the middle”, 
neither the consciousness or experience of individual nor the 
societal totalities.  
The question of what social reality is made of is not only an 
epistemic issue but also (and more deeply) an ontological one. 
The emergence of a vivid ontological debate around social 
ontology is a recent one, stimulate by the work of Margaret 
Gilbert [4], John Searle [5, 6], Barry Smith [7] or Pierre Livet 
and Frédéric Nef [8] in France. Nevertheless, we consider that 
the questioning on the existing entities that the Social sciences 
speaks about must not be an exclusive privilege of some 
philosophers or sociologists who position mainly on social 
ontology, but also the fact of some social scientists or 
philosophers who wants to renew traditional ontological 
divisions for better addressing the duality agency-structure of 
the Social. In doing so, many other social scientists (but not so 
much) can be invited in the social ontological debate.  
Seen like that, and if we willingly exclude for the present 
discussion the Phenomenologist or Interactionist perspectives1 
due to the limited ambition of this communication, three main 
frameworks with many variants seem to appear at that time (the 
eighties): practice theory, actor-network theory and what we 
propose to call an “assemblage theory”, following DeLanda [9]. 
What we propose to do is to recall these three schools, to focus 
on the assemblage theory, and to clarify social ontology 
underlying the last one, for finally discussing its contribution in 
the debate on the philosophies of the (social)Web.  
To be fully honest humanistic, phenomenological or 
interactionist approaches, as well as the text-centered 
hermeneutic models tend to adopt what Quentin Meillassoux 
{10] call in prominent book correlationism2. It is why we 
exclude them.  
                                                                
1 Like Goffmanian microsociology, ethnomethodology or 
Conversation Analysis. 
2 By ‘correlationism‘ he means “the idea according to which we 
only ever have access to the correlation between thinking and 
being, and never to either term considered apart from the 
other…[C]orrelationism [indexes] any current of thought 
which maintains the unsurpassable character of the correlation 
so defined. Consequently, it becomes possible to say that 
every philosophy which disavows naïve realism has become a 
variant of correlationism.” (Meillassoux, 2008, p. 5). He 
denounce the restrained nature (and inconsistency) of the 
premises of post-Kantian continental philosophy and propose 
a new, speculative way of philosophising, based on direct 
access to the external world obtained through mathematical 
reasoning. Correlationist position tacitly holds that we can’t 
really have experience of the world (or in knowledge of 
reality) independently of thought or language. The origins of 
this correlationist turn lie in Kant and his successors, from 
Husserl to Heiddeger to Derrida. 
We claim that it is valuable to pay anew attention to materialist 
and realist options in social theory and philosophy. So we 
propose to refer to some contemporary thinkers who perfectly 
know practice theory as well as actor-network theory or 
arrangement theories, and who make some effort to extricate 
social ontology from them. Doing so, we will be in a position to 
compare the differences between these positive ontologies 
around few features. 
2. SOME MAIN SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES 
We retain in this article three social ontologies: practice theory, 
assemblage theory and actor-network theory. 
2.1 Practice Theory 
Practice theory has its root in Ancient Greek where the word 
praxis referred to activity engaged in by free men. Aristotle held 
that there were three basic activities of man: theoria, poiesis and 
praxis. Three types of knowledge correspond to these three 
kinds of activities. Aristotle further divided practical knowledge 
into ethics, economics and politics. New practice theorists which 
revive Aristotelian conception of moral (and unlike some 
analytic or libertarians philosophers who try to generate moral 
consensus on the basis of an ideal of rationality) could be found 
in philosophical communitarianism, especially in the work of 
Alasdair McIntyre (After Virtue) for who practices is the fabric 
of virtues or mainly Charles Taylor (Sources of the Self). They 
consider classical liberalism to be ontologically and 
epistemologically incoherent. 
Marx himself also alluded to this concept in his Theses on 
Feuerbach when he stated that “The chief defect of all hitherto 
existing materialism (…) is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, 
is conceived only in the form of the object or of contemplation, 
but not as sensuous human activity, practice (…) All social life 
is essentially practical (…) Feuerbach, not satisfied with abstract 
thinking, wants contemplation; but he does not conceive 
sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity”. In 
continuity practice is often also a key entity in critical paradigms 
as in critical theory (“Frankfurt School" theorists like Jürgen 
Habermas, e.g his ‘Theory of Communicative Action’).   
The third influential source of contemporary theory of practice 
is provided by Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations [11]. 
Here he rejected the dominant semantic conception of language 
where “every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated 
with the word. It is the object for which the word stands” 
(Augustine, Confessions, 1. 8.). The exact opposite of what 
semantic web seems to be! Isn’t it? On the contrary, pragmatic 
conception of language treats language as an activity. His 
argument is that meaning is use: words are not defined by 
reference to the objects they designate, nor by the mental 
representations one might associate with them, but by how they 
are used.  
However, the term “theories of practice” was introduced by 
Sherry Ortner in the 1980s to refer to recent theorizing in 
Anthropology, and it is today use to cover the works of a diverse 
set of philosophers and social theorists [12, 13]. Antony 
Giddens cited above is himself well-known for his ‘theory of 
structuration’ and his holistic view of modern societies. 
Structuration theory tried to overcome the duality between 
agency and structure proposing “practice” as a ‘Rosetta stone’ to 
comprehend how a social practice both enables and constrains 
social action. Quite as the same time, Pierre Bourdieu in his 
Outline of a Theory of Practice [14] tried to reconcile the 
influences of both external social structures and subjective 
experience on the individual. Michel Foucault [15] is obviously 
also quoted to belong to the practice camp. In the 
complementary vein, Michel de Certeau in The Practice of 
Everyday Life [16] develops a theory of the productive and 
consumptive activity inherent in everyday life. According to de 
Certeau, everyday life is distinctive from other practices of daily 
existence because it is repetitive and unconscious. 
A ‘situated’ version of social practice theory was elaborated by 
Jean Lave [17] who pioneered the theories of situated cognition. 
She downsized the ‘structuralist view’ of practice still present in 
both Bourdieu and Giddens works by emphasizing that knowing 
is inseparable from doing and by arguing that all knowledge is 
situated in activity bound to social, cultural and physical 
contexts. So social practices virtually pre-exist from agent which 
are ‘participants’ or, as Andreas Reckwitz [18] coined, ‘carriers 
of the practice’ (p. 252). People are always embodied and 
embedded in ongoing historical processes which belong 
themself to a socially and culturally structured world. Lave 
emphasizes the relational interdependence between persons, 
activity, and world. Social practice theory is thus a theory of 
relations. The notion of situated activity assumes that subjects, 
objects, lives, and worlds are made in their relations. “That is, 
the contexts of people’s lives aren’t merely containers or 
backdrops, nor are they simply whatever seems salient to 
immediate experience. Persons are always embodied, located 
uniquely in space and in their relations with other persons, 
things, practices, and institutional arrangements” ([19] p. 2).  
Sharing some features with structurationism and some version of 
social constructivism, she quoted (Hart, 2002, p. 296) saying 
that: “instead of starting with a presumption of pre-existing 
bounded entities – whether spatial, social, or individual – a 
relational approach attends explicitly to ongoing processes of 
constitution. This processual understanding, in turn, is grounded 
in a theory of praxis that asserts the inseparability of situated 
practices and their associated meanings and powers relations”. 
So, as Foucault also brings to light, the situatedness of practice 
involves that living is embedded in political arrangements, 
hegemonic projects, and diffuse relations of power. But, as other 
relationisms (in particular Whitehead’ one), social practice 
theory (and more particularly Marxian ones) belongs 
surprisingly to a relational ontology camp as Hart and Lave 
reassert, most probably through Hegelian dialectic.  
In the new ontological front open by recent disparagements of 
totality and individuality as basic element of the structure of 
social life, practice appears as a principal constitutive element – 
a particular type of entity – in social life3. 
Many studies were done to try to systematize the specific 
principles and concepts of the various theories of the practice, 
which still does not form today a real unified theory. The 
practice turn in contemporary theory edited by Theodore R. 
Schatzki, Karen Knorr Cetina, and Eike von Savigny in 2001 
[21] can be viewed as one of the cornerstone of the practice’ 
                                                                
3 Meanwhile at the same time the concept of practice was 
virulently attack by Stephane Turner [20]. 
revival4. It is said that: “The practice approach … is summed up 
in its forceful opposition to representational accounts: meaning 
and language, arising from and tied to continuous activity, 
cannot be telescoped into representations or mental contents, 
which themselves acquire the property of being about something 
by virtue of how people use and react to them” (p. 12). The 
complexity of practice concept lies in the fact that, as practice 
theory is absolutely a cultural theory ([18], p. 244), and, as such, 
must to evoke some symbolic stuffs and/or language, although it 
can’t resort to any kind of representation or linguistic features to 
explain the shared understanding that emerge inside human 
coexistence, except in term of ‘practice’. It argues that even the 
most apparently “propositional” knowledge acquires meaning 
only in relation to fields of social and embodied practice. 
 
Figure 1. Sameness of practices on Yahoo’s site as Aristotle 
‘praxis’ conception. 5 
So, if they are many conceptions of practice, we propose to 
consider Theodore Shatzki as one of the main philosopher of 
social sciences who is clearly the most ontological oriented, 
even if he doesn’t cover all practice theorists positions. 
According to him practice approaches promulgate a distinct 
social ontology: “the social is a field of embodied, materially 
interwoven practices centrally organized around shared practical 
understandings. This conception contrasts with accounts that 
privilege individuals, (inter)actions, language, signifying 
systems, the life world, institutions/roles, structures, or systems 
in defining the social” (Shatzki and al. 2001, p. 3).  
2.2 Assemblage Theories 
“Assemblage” is a term used by authors of philosophy and 
sciences to characterize to varying degrees the non-unified, non-
hierarchical, non-linear, hybrid, flat, and complex nature of 
wholes. We refer here especially to the seminal metaphysic work 
of Whitehead [23], enrich by some postmodern philosophy 
stances in favour of apparatus [15] and ‘agencement’ [24], 
continued by new continental philosophers like Manuel 
DeLanda [9].  
                                                                
4 See also Knowing in Organizations. A Practice-Based 
Approach edited by D. Nicolini, S. Gherardi and D. Yanow in 
2003 [22]. 
5 The only differences relate to ‘Computer and Internet’… 
Foucault defines an “apparatus” following: “What I’m trying to 
single out with this term is, first and foremost, a thoroughly 
heterogeneous set of consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative 
measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral, and 
philanthropic propositions – in short, the said as much as the 
unsaid. Such are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus 
itself is the network that can be established between these 
elements (…) By the term “apparatus” I mean a kind of a 
formation, so to speak, that at a given historical moment has as 
its major function the response to an urgency. The apparatus 
therefore has a dominant strategic function (…) I said that the 
nature of an apparatus is essentially strategic, which means that 
we are speaking about a certain manipulation of relations of 
forces, either so as to develop them in a particular direction, or 
to block them, to stabilize them, and to utilize them. The 
apparatus is thus always inscribed into a play of power, but it is 
also always linked to certain limits of knowledge that arise from 
it and, to an equal degree, condition it. The apparatus is 
precisely this: a set of strategies of the relations of forces 
supporting, and supported by, certain types of knowledge” [15] 
(194-96). 
Contrary to Foucault who seeks through the figure of the 
apparatus to make the idea of structure more dynamic (in 
structuralism sense), while preserving however the assumption 
of a certain homogeneity of the elements which are connected, 
Deleuze will build the differential of the forces which are 
embodied in assemblages starting from an assumption of radical 
heterogeneity of their components. “Structures are linked to 
conditions of homogeneity, but assemblages are not (…) What 
is an assemblage? It is a multiplicity which is made up of many 
heterogeneous terms and which establishes liaisons, relations 
between them (…) Thus, the assemblage’s only unity is that of 
co-functioning: it is a symbiosis, a "sympathy". It is never 
filiations which are important, but alliances, alloys; these are not 
successions, lines of descent, but contagions, epidemics, the 
wind” [25] (p. 69). 
The main (but crucial) difference among us is that as Foucault 
remains in a neo-structualist posture where, in apparatus, entities 
in relation are linked by internal relations to form a whole as 
totality (relations of interiority), Deleuze calls ‘assemblages’ 
wholes characterized by relations of exteriority (DeLanda, 2006, 
p. 10). Thus, any social entity, on any scale (person, interaction, 
interpersonal network, City, State…) can be described as an 
assemblage who offers us a true alternative to organic totalities. 
In particular, any assemblage could be seen as resulting of an 
emergence starting from complex interactions between 
heterogeneous and autonomous components parts. 
An assemblage refers therefore to the heterogeneous 
components which are ordered in any domain of entities, 
assemblage itself being the system of relations that can be 
established between these elements. Assemblages are non-
essentialist (they are historically contingent actual entities – 
singular individuals - not instances of ideal forms) and non-
totalizing phenomena’s (assemblages are not seamless totalities 
but collections of heterogeneous components that should be 
analyzed as such). An assemblage is a “multiplicity”, a whole 
made of elements (or parts). Unlike organic totalities an 
assemblage is a by-product of interactions between components, 
an emergence. Such multiplicity is a structure of a possibility 
space [26]. 
Assemblage’s identity as possibility space may be 
“parameterized” (or restricted) along primary axes [27]. A first 
axis defines the variable roles a component may play: expressive 
or material. A ‘territorializing’/‘deterritorializing’ axis 
indicating processes in which a component is involved. These 
components are defined by relations of exteriority, i.e. their 'role' 
within a larger assemblage is not what defines them (this would 
be a relation of interiority). This means that a component is self-
subsistent and may be 'unplugged' from one assemblage and 
'plugged' into another without losing its identity. Whereas in 
organic totality the linkages between its components form 
logically necessary relations which make it what whole it is, in 
an assemblage these relations may be only contingently 
obligatory. This second axis specifies the stability of an 
assemblage according to the state of its boundaries (sharp and 
fixed or fuzzy and fluctuating) and the degree of internal 
homogeneity of its components. The degree of mobility 
(behavioral factors) of an assemblage may also determine its 
identity. A third axis defines processes in which specialized 
information constraints intervene in 'coding'/'decoding' the 
assemblage. A high degree of territorialization and codification 
means for an assemblage a weak ability to change. And vice 
versa an assemblage may be said (relatively or absolutely) 
decoded and deterritorialized if it is be able to decontextualize a 
set of relations that partially fixed it (and, thus, destabilized it), 
rendering them virtual (immanent) and preparing them for more 
distant actualizations (like communication technology does). 
Thus the parts of an assemblage are analyzable and assemblage 
itself has irreducible properties to its parts, without being a 
‘totality’. 
Assemblages are also defined by their tendencies and capacities 
[27]. Tendencies can make the properties of a whole vary, as 
when a seed is growing up and changes its own identity, 
becoming a young plant: here the tendency of any seed is to 
grow (if nothing prevents it). On the other hand, capacities make 
a whole exhibits aspects of their identity that were previously 
hidden, as when an apparently neutral plant turns out to possess 
unexpected medicinal powers. But tendencies and capacities 
cannot be listed before they appear due to the relationship 
between entities component the whole and the all different ways 
in which they can affected and by affected each other’s and by 
other wholes. 
Assemblage theory makes it also possible to position social 
entities on all scales, from sub-individual to transnational, 
making the problem of the link between micro- and macro-levels 
of reality non relevant in this ‘flat ontology’ perspective. 
Finally, assemblages necessarily exist in heterogeneous 
populations, which form their context. The relationship between 
an assemblage and its components is complex and non-linear: 
assemblages are formed and affected by heterogeneous 
populations of lower-level assemblages, but may also act back 
upon these components, imposing restraints or adaptations in 
them. 
2.3 Actor-Network Theory 
Actor–network theory is a recent approach to social theory 
which originated in the field of science studies. It is known for 
its controversial insistence on the agency of nonhumans and 
more generally for claiming the introduction of the too often 
neglected objects in social sciences. Enlarging the list of 
workable entities allows envisioning rethinking the old question 
of blend or alliance among entities with new fresh eyes. Actor-
network theory tries to explain how material–semiotic and / or 
actors-objects networks come together to act as a whole.  
Latour pushes thus the concept of assemblage to the limit in the 
Actor-Network Theory [28). In “Irreductions” [29] Latour 
provides the ontological basis for what has become known as 
“actor-network theory”. Here, an active entity (an agent or 
actant) is defined neither by itself (identity, essence) nor by its 
relations (its network). This apparent paradox is possible 
because the question of the actors and their network is always 
empirically untied, during trials in which agents, and mediations 
on which they rely on, operate translations enabling them at the 
same time (or not) to enter in relation, and to be defined as 
acting individual and collective entities. The dynamic 
“mediation-translation-trial” associates (according to 
dimensions which are themselves heterogeneous) and stabilizes 
an initial plurality of heterogeneous entities according to a 
certain trajectory (to go further, see participation).  
3. WHAT ARE THE MAIN FEATURES 
FOR SOCIAL ONTOLOGY? 
We try to propose some taxonomy of philosophers in order to 
see more clearly in some ontological statements, based on a free 
reading of Harman lecture [30, 31, 32], because he is a 
sagacious analyst of the current ontological situation. 
Harman sets out to develop what he calls an object-oriented 
philosophy (OOP). Taking the tool-analysis as the momentum in 
twentieth-century philosophy, Harman finds in Heidegger the 
roots of metaphysics which place the ‘things’ at the center of 
reality, like many Heideggerian philosophers (ie Stiegler among 
many others). Although he considers phenomenology to be 
deficient in that it subordinates the independent life of objects to 
our (human) access to them (position closed to Quentin 
Meillassoux’s correlationism). Against the Kantian tradition, his 
object-oriented philosophy considers the neglected real life of 
objects to be a ‘line of flight’ for a new ‘speculative 
metaphysics’ [33]. It is possible to pair Whitehead and Latour as 
object-oriented philosophers according to Harman. The two of 
them are philosophers of concrete, actual and individual entities 
(actual entity or actual occasion for Whitehead and ‘actant’ for 
Latour6). But Harman breaks up at the same time from 
Whitehead and Latour on the definition of his object ontology. 
According to him, Whitehead turns entities into clusters of 
relations, while he hold that only a non-relational model of 
object is capable of accounting for both the transient and 
enduring faces of reality (Harman, 2011 b., p. 292). Focus on 
becoming (as well as Whitehead, like Deleuze besides in the 
current fashion) is only possible with a non-relational ontology 
(as opposed to what Whitehead or Deleuze would however 
propose). Compared to the question of becoming only, object 
oriented philosophy is thus distinguished also from the 
philosophy of Deleuze, where there is no place for concrete 
entities7. And by rebounds, Deleuze would not be 
Whiteheadian! 
But it is not possible to accord Latour and Harman because 
Harman [31] promotes a dual category of objects (real objects 
                                                                
6 It is perhaps insubstantial to qualify Whitehead of philosopher 
of the process like Rescher [34] does it.  
7 Although bridging between Whitehead and Deleuze was 
established by Isabelle Stengers. 
and sensual objects or intentional objects) completely 
antagonistic from ‘the flat ontology’ of Bruno Latour (as 
Hartman admits in Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and 
Metaphysics [30]. And, as we have previously said, Harman 
excludes Whitehead because the latter treat individual things as 
bundles of relations. Finally Harman’ object-oriented position is 
the only one among other Speculative Realists that might be 
called both Heideggerian and Whiteheadian8. 
Contrary to appearances the link between Whitehead and 
Deleuze is not so evident: the core entity of Whitehead ontology 
is the ‘actual entity’ or concrete individual9 (or ‘actants’ as 
Latour calls it to denote human and non-human actors) whereas 
entities or actors are not the core of reality nor for Deleuze or 
any other ‘virtualists”, the first of which Bergson. Bergson 
avoids breaking reality into discrete states. It is the same for 
Simondon which presupposes a ‘pre-individual’ dimension of 
any reality (Simondon conceived of "pre-individual fields" as 
the funds making individuation itself possible). And for Manuel 
DeLanda there is always what it is called a ‘space of possibility’ 
[27] deeper than any actualized individual. Deleuze refers to as 
a diagram, a set of universal singularities (they more or less 
represent ideal types in Max Weber terms, but surely not 
essences) that would structure the space of possibilities (or 
multiplicity10) associated with the assemblage. Deleuze defines a 
diagram as a display of relations of force, or of a distribution of 
capacities to affect and be affected [9]. To conclude on this 
point let us say that some thinkers take individual entities as 
primary (Whitehead, Latour, Harman) whereas some others view 
them as derivative (Bergson, Simondon, Deleuze11 or DeLanda). 
Whiteheadian ‘actual entities’ are not a durable substance (they 
lies behind their accidents, qualities or relations like in tropes 
‘view promoted by Livet and Nef [8] because they perpetually 
and instantly perish and be transformed (if they succeed in 
binding to or prehend other entities) to new actual entities. The 
same holds for Latour: according to actor–network theory, such 
actor-networks are potentially transient, existing in a constant 
making and re-making. This means that relations need to be 
repeatedly “performed” or the network will dissolve.  
 
 
                                                                
8 Generally, Heideggarians (like Derrida) speak most about the 
“failures of presence” and not so much about inanimate 
relations without sentient observers (they are correlationist in 
some ways) whereas Whitheadian (such as Latour) are 
relationalist but they are not attracted by the idea of a hidden 
reality concealed from all presence. 
9 « Actual entity – also termed ‘actual occasion’ – are the final 
real things of which the world is made up” ([23], p. 18). 
10 This is why it is not possible to equal multiplicity (Deleuze) 
and actor-network (Latour) as however many commentators of 
the two authors do it. 
11 Conversely Deleuze does not speak of the actualization of the 
virtual in terms of the “things”, but in terms of the “event”, 
where an event is inessential, unexpected anomalous, 
seemingly impossible from the current state of affairs, and 
therefore capable of opening up the future, making a 
difference, and changing the world. Every actualization of the 
virtual is an event [35]. 
 Whitehead Deleuze Latour Schatzki 
Livet & 
Nef 
Harman 
Object yes no yes no no yes 
Relation external external external internal internal no 
Virtuality no? yes no no? yes no 
Context no no no yes yes no 
Becoming no? yes yes? no? no yes 
Figure 2. Some Social Ontologies candidates 
On the side of the theories of the practice, in bond with 
arrangement theory, the things seem more complicated. 
Frequently practice theorists make a claim in favor of splitting 
reality in two (articulated) parts: activity (process of 
production12) and some social order which constitute a ‘context’ 
for activity: Structure and Agency for Giddens; Field and 
Habitus for Bourdieu; social order and situated practices for 
Lave, person’s identity embedded in a community for Taylor 
and so on. 
Schatzki [37] (p. xi) characterizes thus social life or human 
coexistence primary by is grounding in something he called “the 
site of the social”. The social site is a specific context of human 
coexistence, the place where, and as part of which, social life 
inherently occurs. This site-context is composed of a mesh of 
orders13 and practices: “Orders are arrangements of entities (e.g., 
people, artifacts, things), whereas practices are organized 
activities” (p. xi). Human coexistence thus transpires as and 
amid an elaborate, constantly evolving nexus of arranged things 
and organized activities. By doing that Schatzki argues in favor 
of ontology of place (embedding milieu or medium, closely 
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 Fischbach establishes in a convincing way filiation between 
Spinoza and Marx around the idea of ontology of the productive 
activity and of its primacy on any other authority. According to 
Marx and Engels, for individuals, the mode of production is "a 
definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on 
their part. As individuals express their life, so they are. What 
they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with 
what they produce and how they produce" [36]. This idea is 
articulated around a principle common to Spinoza and Marx, by 
whom this last breaks with the metaphysics of subjectivity 
suitable for the German idealism: the assertion of the integral 
inscription of the man in nature. History and Nature are link and 
form a unity because the natural conditions of the human 
production are as much its historical conditions. Affirming that, 
we can measure the cost of the correlationism which brings 
back, in a typically idealistic epic, the production process of 
reality to that of its human access. This retreat affects in 
particular the theory of the practice, in particular in its 
Wittgensteinian versions, even if the term ‘Form of life’ 
(German Lebensform) used by Ludwig Wittgenstein connotes 
the sociological, historical, linguistic, physiological, and 
behavioral determinants that comprise the matrix within which a 
given language has meaning. 
13 What made us choose Schatzki among others practice 
theorists it is that the social order is theorized there as an 
assemblage. Through Schatzki’s work a link between practice 
and assemblage theories can be found. As he said: “As the 
master figure organizing this treatise’s account of the social, the 
distinction between arrangements and practices runs throughout 
the book” (p. xii).  
related also to the ideas of Martin Heidegger14) and considers 
that analyzing the social through the concept of site offers 
several advantages over rival social ontological paths, especially 
individualist ontologies and also other anti-individualisms, 
above all ‘structuralists” which suffer from a tendency toward 
hypostatization (fascination for abstract structures).  
But the main confrontation is between what he calls himself 
“theories of arrangements” and “practice theories”. The term 
“arrangement” denotes a group of thinkers who takes 
arrangements of entities to be the principal compositional 
feature of social life. If the word “arrangements” does not appear 
as such, the relevant expressions are instead apparatus (or 
assemblages) (Foucault), assemblages (or arrangements) 
(Deleuze and Guattari) and actor-networks (Latour and Callon). 
Arrangements are “social things organized in configurations, 
where they hang together, determine one another via their 
connections, as combined both exert effects on other 
configurations of things and are transformed through the action 
of other configurations, and therewith constitute the setting and 
medium of human action, interaction, and coexistence” (p. xiii).  
Almost two main differences cleaves the two sets of categories 
of social ontology: theories of arrangements are anchored in 
social nominalism which contends that sociality can be 
explained solely through the properties of and relations among 
the particular entities that compose social life whereas 
contextualism argues that these matters must be referred to a 
context, different from these entities, in which the latter exists. 
By “context” contextualists means a setting or backdrop that 
envelops and determines phenomena. Examples of contexts are 
economic systems, social structures, hierarchical distributions of 
power or capital, webs of meaning, discourses, and social 
practices. Social Nominalists on the contrary maintain that the 
character and transformation of arrangements are beholden to 
nothing but properties of and transactions among the 
components of arrangements. Individualist ontologies are 
nominalist in essence whereas ‘collectivist’ ontologies are not. 
Theories of arrangements creates new major division because 
they are nor individualist nor holistic ontologies. 
A second ontological issue is nested around humanist and post-
humanist confrontation. As humanism assumes numerous forms, 
humanism consist here in the claim that human agency is both a 
highest form of agency and have a greatest significance to life 
on earth. In contrast, post-humanism stresses the causal 
significance of entities other than humans for social life. It could 
join the non correlationnist point of view in some ways. Here 
the boundary between practice theory and theories of 
arrangement is more porous because thinkers who underline the 
mediation of intellectual functioning by cultural tools (like 
Activity Theory or Distributed Cognition Theory but also actor-
network theory with its intermediaries and mediators), even 
those who fall under the thesis of the ‘externalism’ in the 
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 By triangulation we can advance that if practice’ ontology can 
be articulated with the ‘scaffolding’ of Heideggerian - 
Wittgensteinian ontology (except with regard to the role given to 
the constraint carried out by the social structure and conflicts in 
the social reproduction) by contrast it should not be truly 
compatible with an approach of Whiteheadian - Latourian 
ontology.  
philosophy of mind15, can be classified sometimes in practice 
theories camp sometimes in theories of arrangements camp 
(Whiteheadian process ontology and actor-network theory for 
sure). The case of Activity Theory is complex because it does 
not belong to a practice theory current of thought, emphasizes 
the prominent roles of tools whereas considers that the 
distinction between subject and object lies in human's agency 
and, doing so, separated from its theoretical counterparts on the 
former point, namely Actor-Network Theory. Various post 
humanists analyses, including theories of arrangements as well 
as of practice, stress the causal significance of entities other than 
humans for social life and threaten to dissolve human agency 
into the actions of nonhuman entities. This is why the moving, 
the overlap or the ‘blurring’ of boundary between human and 
other entities form a radical distinction between social 
ontologies. Considering these two ontological issues Schatzki 
condemns the rejection of context and deplores the debunking of 
the human agency in post humanists works. This criterion meets 
the question of the correlationnism. 
A third issue distinguishes the different conceptions of social 
and relates to the nature of the order itself. Order is a basic 
dimension of any domain of entities, if we accept that things 
tend not to form random aggregates but on the contrary clusters 
of inter-related determinate stuff. Order is thus the basic 
disposition of a domain of entities, the way that things are laid 
out or hang together in that domain. Social order as connection 
may be figured out by many socio ontological conceptions: 
order as human ‘rational’ action, practices (as in practice’ 
version of cultural theory), social structure (holism) or 
emergence (like in virtual space of possibility modeled by 
DeLanda from Deleuze). But the main line of divide is between 
conceptions of order that claims that social life contains 
perduring and substantive orders and these, more and more 
numerous, for which organizations and orders are in reality 
precarious, unstable, and transitory beings. ‘Ordering’ [38] or 
‘Organizing’ [39, 40] and many other conceptualizations 
designate by contrast the dynamic processes that contribute to 
the ‘making of’ any enterprise (to unique encounter on the street 
to a complete domain of activity). In this new conceptualization 
of orders interdependence or coordination are put ahead 
(whereas regularity or stability): the constraint consisting to be 
connected to exist subordinates the semantics of the totality and 
the identity of the entities to coordination as a dynamics and 
emergent process.  
But in the race for various alternatives to well-defined and well-
organized enduring wholes, contemporary practices theories, but 
above all assemblage theories, are on the cutting edge of social 
ontologies. The issue is that much social ontologies interpret 
interdependence as regularized ties, interchanges, or reciprocity. 
And regulated means no arbitrary, which equates order with 
generic state of affairs. Interdependence connotes also mutual 
dependence, which is the trademark of the ontological 
conceptions based on the idea of internal relations (that of 
Wittgenstein, if one believes Descombes [41] in his own version 
of structural holism. See also [42]): here element is always a 
part of some sort of whole as if this whole seems to be not fully 
                                                                
15 which hold that the mind is not only the result of what is 
going on inside the nervous system (or the brain) but also of 
what either occur or exist outside the subject, like Andy Clark 
or enactivism and embodied cognition. 
integrated. Descombes calls the doctrine that he defends, 
derived from Wittgenstein, “anthropological holism” or 
“structural holism”. It is the view that meaning or thought of any 
kind inheres in a whole network of practices, institutions, mores, 
and “forms of life” and form a concept he calls ‘objective mind’ 
(in reference to Hegel). This is a holistic position because it 
maintains that meaning is only given in a totality rather than in a 
one-to-one relation between a representation and its object. The 
totality in question is one made up of the human institutions and 
practices that anthropologists study (illustrated by Yahoo 
Groups!), which differs from the sort of semantic holism 
generally discussed by cognitivists (and analytic style 
philosophers) around action or isolated inference. In holism the 
concept of an order, of a structure of relations and, above all, 
rules (in the normative rather that causal sense) is thus crucial 
but, as we will see further, renew a holistic tradition, that we 
find wrong, leading from Hegel (or Montesquieu) through 
Durkheim to functionalist and structural-functionalist period. 
So the question of order cleaves two main different ontological 
assumptions: one which supposes internal relations and, in some 
ways, an idea of totality; and another which posit the doctrine of 
external relations and, as Meillassoux calls it, a ‘non-totalisable 
being’, a position where structure of the possible as such must 
necessarily be un-totalizable16. Practice theories are usually in 
favor of the doctrine of internal relations, the work of Livet and 
Nef too, whereas Deleuze and Guattari and Callon and Latour, 
although not belonging at all to the same camps according to the 
nominalist versus contextualist criterion or in virtue of their 
opposition on the virtual versus non virtual character of 
assemblages, meet to privilege the doctrines of the external 
relations.  
So we argue in favor of social order as arrangements or 
assemblages, but not like theories of practice because they are 
contextualist (activity/context), pro-correlationist and thus non 
nominalist17. For example Schatzki maintain: “What a thing of 
social life is cannot be fixed. A garden rock, say, can suddenly 
become a paperweight and at a later moment a weapon (…). In 
general, both what things are and the state(s) of affairs a given 
configuration of things constitutes depend on the things 
involved and their properties in conjunction with how people act 
toward and understand them” (p. 16). Social nominalism 
contends that the character and transformation of sociality can 
be explained solely through the properties of and relations 
among the particular entities that compose social life (and not by 
                                                                
16 Like Badiou, Meillassoux argues that only those theories that 
― “ratify the non-All”, hence excluding any possible 
conceivability of a totality, can be defined as ontological, 
given that being is the non-totalisable. 
17
 Trope theory in metaphysics could be on a certain plan 
sympathetic with assemblage theory because it is a version of 
nominalism. Foucault, who is an eminent representative of the 
practice theory camps, was absolutely nominalist in his way of 
studying the forms of power. Power is not a concept, an 
institution or an abstract structure. “Power must be understood 
in the first instance as the multiplicity of force relations 
immanent in the sphere in which they operate and which 
constitute their own organization” (Foucault [43], The History 
of Sexuality, 1:92). Power thus designates the reticular force 
relation organization of particulars in the social. Indeed, the 
social is this reticular organization of particulars. 
evoking some ‘context’, different from these entities). Social 
nominalism is common to Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, 
Latour and, as tropes theory, to Livet and Nef (whereas they 
seem to defend the doctrine of internal relations!). 
To conclude, challenging the individual as a basic entity of 
social ontology, Pierre Livet and Frederic Nef grant this place to 
the structures, precisely with the structural constraints, of our 
social activities. The authors decipher then how the interactions 
proceed, are carried out. And, also challenging the reduction of 
social reality to our mental constructions, they defend structural 
realism then: if they admit limiting their analysis to the field of 
the human activities, they are interested in the methods of the 
social interaction apart from the experiment that we have some, 
or how they remain with their investment by the men. They 
confer a share of virtual thus to them, besides their actuality. 
The social interactions are the starting point of the ontology of 
social of Livet and Nef. At the beginning of the analysis, there 
are not for them initially the individuals, but their relations, 
which they define as being ways of an element in another. The 
structure of an interaction becomes a network when the way 
makes it possible to return to its starting element, when it forms 
a loop. It happens nevertheless inevitably that breakdowns of 
network occur. The loop is then not buckled, when an actor is 
failing or when the environment of the activity prevents, and one 
does not return to the starting point, at the point of starting of 
the loop. To these breakdowns of network, Livet and Nef 
suggest the solution of the substitutability of the activities: In 
the couple of activities “hunting-gathering”, the two activities 
can replace one the other when one or the other does not 
succeed. This clarifies their choices to place the ‘processes’ at 
the center of social ontology (or ontology of the recursion 
process). Social reality is thus a phenomenon of potentiality: in 
an exchange, an activity is virtual whereas the other is current. 
The ontology of operations attempts to describe networks and 
virtual processes based on the substitutability of the activities. 
The substitutability of the activities within an exchange implies 
internal relations (e.g of a context, as in practice theories) and at 
the same times the assumption of virtual processes at the core of 
social operation (like assemblage theories). One can thus say 
that they choose the anti-correlationnist option and the virtual 
one, very closed to DeLanda work, but privilege the internal 
relations, as practice theorists. In doing so, they can’t really 
think a whole as an emergent property from the interactions 
between componants, as DeLanda do following Deleuze. And 
by making substantial the contents of the exchanges, they share 
the object-oriented philosophy, but in Harman’s version. 
4. CONCLUSION 
This paper is a contribution to elicit some strong theoretical 
claims about conceptual domain ontological options made 
regarding the empirical social domain. Its purpose is to initiate a 
novel approach to social ontology around the kind of entities 
could exist, what could be the relations between them and what 
could be the form and the properties of social processes. Thus, it 
investigate some contemporary ontological propositions who 
share some strong ‘air de famille’ but also profound differences. 
We hope that it will help researchers to make their social 
ontology more coherent. 
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ABSTRACT 
This paper tries to relate the recent concerns about personalized 
filtering on the internet to Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology. In “The Filter Bubble”, Eli Pariser describes how 
personalized filtering of online contents may result in a “self 
loop”, amplifying the user’s interests and opinions. It will be 
argued that there are structural similarities between the concept of 
the filter bubble and Heidegger’s concept of technology as 
enframing. Also the latter addresses a filtered perception of reality 
which reinforces itself. In both cases, the dynamics under 
consideration ultimately threaten human freedom. A comparison 
of filter bubble and enframing might not only produce a deeper 
understanding of both phenomena, but reveal the discussion of 
self-affirming dynamics as an essential task for media studies. 
Keywords 
enframing, filter bubble, Heidegger, technology 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As the vast amount of data on the Internet is growing faster 
than ever, filtering becomes a necessity. Internet giants like 
Facebook or Google have chosen a way that is different from the 
editorial selection typical of traditional broadcast media. They 
offer personalized filters instead of general ones. 
While for a long time this break with the agenda setting of 
traditional broadcast media was considered an advantage of the 
Internet, in the new millennium a different a different perspective 
evolved. In a book released in 2011, Eli Pariser expresses his 
concerns about this tendency towards personalization on the web. 
As personalization becomes more and more usual, he argues, we 
will increasingly become embedded in a filter bubble, in “your 
own personal, unique universe of information that you live in 
online.” ([10]) The pervasive tendency towards personalization is 
problematic, as it “moves us very quickly toward a world in which 
the Internet is showing us what it thinks we want to see, but not 
necessarily what we need to see.” ([10]) 
The idea is not new: In 2001, Cass Sunstein conceived 
personalized news as “The Daily We” and wondered if the 
Internet really was a blessing for democracy (cf. [13]). Also, 
concerns have been raised for quite a while about a fragmentation 
of the public sphere, where communication only takes place 
between people with similar interests and attitudes. 
My claim in this paper is that the filter bubble may serve as a 
model that illustrates a more general concept about the self-
affirming dynamics of our technologies: Martin Heidegger’s 
concept of the enframing. Relating these two ideas may result in 
mutual benefits: it might help to establish a better understanding 
of Heidegger’s notoriously difficult and notoriously 
misunderstood concerns, and in turn the kind of problem that Eli 
Pariser calls attention to may be grasped more precisely in 
Heidegger’s terms. Ultimately the paper suggests developing the 
concept of a local enframing as a critical tool for media studies. 
2. FILTER BUBBLE 
Facebook and Google were the places where Pariser first 
became aware of the effects of personalization. “I noticed one day 
that the conservatives had disappeared from my Facebook feed”, 
he tells us. “And what it turned out was going on was that 
Facebook was looking at which links I clicked on, and it was 
noticing that, actually, I was clicking more on my liberal friends’ 
links that on my conservative friends’ links. And without 
consulting me about it, it had edited them out.” ([10]) 
The same kind of editing, Pariser found out, also happened 
on Google: He asked two friends to search for “Egypt” on Google. 
The results were drastically different: “Daniel didn’t get anything 
about the protests in Egypt at al in his first page of Google results. 
Scott’s results were full of them. And this was the big story of the 
day at that time. That’s how different these results are becoming.” 
([10]) 
Personalization is used at a lot of other places too: On online 
dating platforms, obviously, but also more and more on news 
portals. Why is Pariser worried about this development? He sees a 
number of problematic effects that occur with the rise of filtering. 
One serious consequence for democracy is the decline of the 
public sphere: “In the filter bubble, the public sphere – the realm 
in which common problems are identified and addressed – is just 
less relevant.” ([11], p. 148) Another one is the “friendly world 
syndrome”: “[S]ome important public problems will disappear. 
Few people seek out information about homelessness, or share it, 
for that matter. In general, dry, complex, slow moving problems – 
a lot of the truly significant issues – won’t make the cut.” ([11], p. 
150f) This relates to another issue: “[I]nstead of a balanced 
information diet, you can end up surrounded by information junk 
food.” ([10]) 
However, at the centre of all these tendencies there is one 
effect that Pariser calls “the you loop:” “The filter bubble tends to 
dramatically amplify confirmation bias – in a way, it’s designed 
to. Consuming information that conforms to our ideas of the 
world is easy and pleasurable; consuming information that 
challenges us to think in new ways or question our assumptions is 
frustrating and difficult.” ([11], p. 88) Personalized filtering 
directs us towards doing the former: „[T]he filter bubble isn’t 
tuned for a diversity of ideas or of people. It’s not designed to 
introduce us to new cultures. As a result, living inside it, we may 
miss some of the mental flexibility and openness that contact with 
difference creates.” ([11], p. 101) This is not only a danger for 
democracy, but also for freedom. For freedom, Pariser explains, 
cannot be reduced to being able to do what you want. First you 
need to know what is possible to do. (cf. [11], p. 112) “When you 
enter a filter bubble, you’re letting the companies that construct it 
choose which options you’re aware of. You may think you are the 
captain of your own destiny, but personalization can lead you 
down a road to a kind of informational determinism in which what 
you’ve clicked on in the past determines what you see next – a 
Web history you’re doomed to repeat. You can get stuck in a 
static, ever-narrowing vision of yourself – an endless you-loop.” 
([11], p. 16) 
Also Cass Sunstein perceived filtering as a threat to 
democracy and freedom.1 An important difference, however, is 
that Sunstein was concerned with personalization that the user 
consciously chooses. This does not hold in the filter bubble: 
“When you turn on Fox News or read The Nation, you’re making 
a decision about what kind of filter to use to make sense of the 
world. It’s an active process, and like putting on a pair of tinted 
glasses, you can guess how the editor’s leaning shapes your 
perception. You don’t make the same kind of choice with 
personalized filters. They come to you – and because they drive 
up profits for the Web site that uses them, they’ll become harder 
and harder to avoid.” ([11], p. 10) So for Pariser maybe the most 
dangerous thing about filter bubbles is that they are not aware of 
them: “In fact, from within the bubble, it’s nearly impossible to 
see how biased it is.” ([11], p. 10) Accordingly, the mission of his 
book, and the first step towards solving the problem, is to render 
the filter bubble visible (cf. [11], p. 20). A second step would be 
to think about how serendipity happens and how it could be 
promoted by software design decisions (cf. [11], p. 235f). 
My claim in what follows will be that the filter bubble can 
serve as a model to understand a more generic concept about the 
self-amplifying dynamics of technologies: Martin Heidegger’s 
concept of technology as enframing. 
3. ENFRAMING 
Martin Heidegger’s esoteric and idiosyncratic terminology 
has given rise to a lot of misunderstandings. As often, building 
bridges between different kinds of vocabularies might help to 
clarify things. I will try to do this by relating the dynamics Eli 
Pariser describes to the ones Heidegger describes. 
If for Pariser it is the enormous amount of data online that 
requires filtering, Heidegger’s concern is the inexhaustible 
richness of Being getting filtered. Being is no mythic or divine 
entity but simply refers to the meaning of the word “to be”, to our 
understanding of what it means that something “is”. So Being 
obviously is strongly intertwined with language. 
The inexhaustible richness of Being is not a kind of 
mythological postulate, but a simple consequence of the 
historicity of Being. As Heidegger tries to show, every culture and 
epoch had its own understanding of Being. This understanding 
changes, as language changes. And as we have no idea about how 
                                                                
1 “Unanticipated encounters, involving unfamiliar and even 
irritating topics and points of view, are central to democracy and 
to freedom itself.” ([13]) 
language might develop, there is no basis for determining a 
definite set of possible understandings of Being. 
As a consequence, every historical culture has its own 
clearing of Being, which is at the same time concealment and 
unconcealment. While a vast majority of possible understandings 
of reality remain hidden for us, a certain understanding unfolds. 
Thus with every clearing of Being, only certain few aspects of 
reality become accessible for us. 
This means that the respective clearing defines our 
possibilities in thinking and acting, and, more fundamentally, our 
possible horizons of meaning. Richard Rorty puts it this way: “For 
Heidegger – early and late – what one is is the practices one 
engages in, and especially the language, the final vocabulary, one 
uses. For that vocabulary determines what one can take as a 
project.” ([12], p. 109)2 The clearing of Being thus provides a 
refined concept for discussing a matter that also Pariser is 
concerned with: “Not knowing that it is possible to be an 
astronaut is just as much a prohibition against becoming one as 
knowing and being barred from doing so.” ([11], p. 112f.) The 
matter at stake is freedom. 
If the clearing of Being is historical, it can change. With 
Heidegger, we can grasp freedom precisely as the mutability of 
the conceptual framework that mediates our access to reality. 
Freedom relies on what I want to call hermeneutic oscillation: on 
a condition where various modes of unconcealment are 
suspending and balancing each other.3 
We can consider the clearing of Being as a filtering of the 
inexhaustible richness of Being: “Beings can be as beings only if 
they stand within and stand out within what is cleared in this 
clearing.” ([7], p. 178) Freedom thus requires that this filtering 
must not become static: It must not always be the same aspects of 
reality that get filtered out or that make it through the filter. Only 
then new aspects of reality may appear and provide us with new 
possibilities of thinking and action. 
Heidegger’s history of Being could thus be rephrased as a 
history of filters on the possible meanings of Being. In the modern 
age, or, as Heidegger puts it, “the Age of the World Picture”, “an 
essential decision takes place regarding what is, in its entirety.” 
([8], p. 130) Man is understood as the subject and all entities 
become objects: “Man becomes that being upon which all that is, 
is grounded as regards the manner of its Being and its truth. Man 
becomes the relational center of that which is as such.” ([8], p. 
128) As man is placed as the relational center of everything that 
is, the world becomes a picture, a representation for him. 
 “Here to represent [vor-stellen] means to bring what is 
present at hand [das Vorhandene] before oneself as something 
                                                                
2 As we will see in the course of the following considerations, the 
clearing of being is not only constituted by language, but also 
by technologies and technical artefacts. Both aspects have been 
addressed frequently in Heidegger’s writings. 
3 For Heidegger’s concept of freedom, cf. “On the Essence of 
Truth, p. 115-138 in [7]. Understood in this way, freedom is not 
something that man possesses as a property. “At best, the 
converse holds: freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein 
possesses man – so originally, that only it secures for humanity 
that distictive relatedness to being as a whole which first founds 
all history.” ([7], p. 127) 
standing over against, to relate it to oneself, to the one 
representing it, and to force it back into this relationship to 
oneself as the normative realm.” ([8], p. 131) This means that 
everything that is, is, insofar it can be related to man. With other 
words, everything that cannot be related to man is filtered from 
the clearing of Being: all aspects of reality that are not relevant to 
man cease to exist.4 
My suggestion is that the age of the world picture, as a 
reconfiguration of the ontological sphere, structurally corresponds 
to the introduction of personalized filtering on the internet: 
Everything that cannot be related to oneself as relevant in some 
way is filtered out of existence. 
For Heidegger, the modern reconfiguration of the clearing of 
Being has serious ethical consequences, as it implies that in 
everything man does, he is only concerned with aspects of reality 
that in some way relate to himself. However, this constellation is 
radicalized with the advent of modern technology. 
Heidegger calls the Wesen of technology the enframing [Ge-
stell]. While Wesen usually is translated as essence, I suggest that 
ontological dynamics is a more appropriate translation. For in 
Heidegger the notion does not refer to any supposed nature of 
things, but to the way they relate to changes in the clearing of 
Being.5 Technology, according to Heidegger, is not merely a 
means. “Technology is a mode of revealing. The dynamics of 
technology are situated in the realm where revealing and 
unconcealment take place, where aletheia, truth, happens.” ([7], p. 
3196) 
What are those ontological effects of technology that 
Heidegger describes as Ge-stell? Everything is revealed only as 
standing-reserve [Bestand], things may only enter the clearing of 
Being to the extent that they can be conceptualized as an 
instrument or challenged as a resource. Observe that the Ge-stell 
mode of revealing is narrower than the world-picture mode: 
                                                                
4 As the man of the modern age, according to Heidegger, is 
metaphysically conceived as animal rationale, there are first 
and foremost two modes of that relation: either things serve as 
an experience [Erlebnis] for man as an animal, or things can be 
measured scientifically by rational man. 
5 Although Heidegger dedicates several pages to explaining his 
reinterpretation of the term (cf. e.g. [7], p. 334ff), many 
interpreters still hold on to the traditional notion of Wesen. 
6 Translation modified. German original: „Die Technik west in 
dem Bereich, wo Entbergen und Unverborgenheit, wo aletheia, 
wo Wahrheit geschieht.“ ([6], p. 17) This statement has to be 
read carefully: The realm, where the dynamics of technology, 
understood in the Heideggerian sense as enframing, are situated, 
is the clearing of Being. In many of his writings, Heidegger 
indicates that this clearing is not only constituted by language, 
but also by artifacts, tools and machines (cf. e.g. the tool 
analysis in “Being and Time”). So there is always a 
technological aspect in the clearing of Being. This aspect, 
however, is to be distinguished from enframing as a certain 
tendency in the dynamics of the clearing of Being in the age of 
technology. For any attempt to estimate Heidegger’s relevance 
for media studies, it is essential to clarify the exact relation 
between technological artifacts and the tendency of enframing: 
What kinds of artifacts and infrastructures do promote 
enframing, and why? 
“Whatever stands by in the sense of standing-reserve no longer 
stands against us as object.” ([7], p. 322) Now what in some way 
relates to man may no more pass through the filter but only that 
which is useful for our purposes. This means that our possibilities 
of being in the world become more narrow too:7 Heidegger 
contrasts the river Rhine, technologically perceived as an energy 
supplier or as a tourist attraction, with the Rhine as it appears in 
the poetry of Hölderlin (cf.[7], p. 321). 
Technology filters reality in a way so that we perceive only 
the aspects of reality where it is successful.8 And the more we 
perceive technology as successful, the more it will reinforce not 
only its own take on reality, but also the corresponding horizons 
of meaning that drive our activities. “Man clings to what is readily 
available and controllable […], concealing as a fundamental 
occurrence has sunk into forgottenness.” ([7], p. 132f) In a similar 
way, Pariser states that the filter bubble transforms “known 
unknowns into unknown unknowns”. ([11], p. 106) We can 
explore this structural resemblance further: “Left to their own 
devices, personalization filters serve as a kind of invisible 
autopropaganda, indoctrinating us with our own ideas, amplifying 
our desire for things that are familiar and leaving us oblivious to 
the dangers lurking in the dark territory of the unknown.” ([11], p. 
15) As everything is filtered that is mysterious or does not fit into 
the established conceptualizations, those conceptualizations 
become static. “By disavowing itself in and for forgottenness, the 
mystery leaves historical man in the sphere of what is readily 
available to him […],” states Heidegger. And Pariser stresses that 
“[i]f personalization is too accute, it could prevent us from 
coming into contact with the mind-blowing, perception-shattering, 
experiences and ideas that change how we think about the world 
and ourselves.” ([11], p. 15) 
Both in the filter bubble and in enframing, man is stuck in a 
certain conceptualization of reality. When Heidegger says that 
thus the essence [Wesen] of man is threatened by technology (cf. 
[7], p. 333), this does not involve any essentialist claims about the 
nature of man. On the contrary, it means that the ontological 
dynamics of man have come to stagnate; that the indefinite 
possibilities of what man might be have been narrowed down to 
one single understanding of man that is amplified and reinforced 
by the relational system of our technologies. In the same way, “the 
economics of personalization,” according to Pariser, “push toward 
a static conception of personhood.” ([11], p. 216) 
                                                                
7 “The only thing that is ever questionable is how we can measure 
and fathom and exploit the world as quickly as possible, as 
securely as possible, as completely as possible […].” ([2], p. 
41f.) 
8 Quantification is an essential feature in the filtering that renders 
technological access to reality successful: “Calculation refuses 
to let anything appear except what is countable. Everything is 
only whatever it counts. […] Only because number can be 
infinitely multiplied, irrespective of whether this occurs in the 
direction of the large or the small, can the consuming dynamics 
of calculation hide behind its products and lend to calculative 
thinking the semblance of productivity - whereas already in its 
anticipatory grasping, and not primarily in its subsequent 
results, such thinking lets all beings count only in the form of 
what can be set at our disposal and consumed..” ([3], p 235, 
translation modified) 
This section tried to make transparent that Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology does not address any supposed 
opposition of nature and technology, but a self-amplifying 
dynamics that structurally resembles the one described by Eli 
Pariser’s filter bubble. One thing we can learn from these 
similarities is that there are actually multiple ways of drawing on 
Heidegger for a critical enquiry into today’s media environments. 
The more traditional way would be analyze if and how media and 
technological infrastructures contribute to enframing by making 
everything available as a standing reserve. However, for those 
who do not accept Heidegger’s narrative about the totality of 
technological access to the world in our age, there exists another 
way of making use of Heidegger’s considerations. Since 
enframing, like the filter bubble, is about self-amplifying 
dynamics, the concept can also be employed without any claims 
of totality, to identify local enframings:9 conceptual frameworks 
that reinforce themselves, horizons of meaning that we have 
become stuck in without being aware of it. In this approach, 
concrete media or technological infrastructures could be analyzed 
with respect to their ontological dynamics: Do they promote 
hermeneutic oscillation or do they establish local enframings? Do 
they allow for a mutability of concepts, or do they reinforce 
established understandings? The first crucial step in destabilizing 
local enframings, however, might be to realize that we always are 
exposed to a clearing of Being that is constituted by our language 
and our technologies and that is in danger of becoming static. 
4. THE SELF-AFFIRMING DYNAMICS OF 
TECHNOLOGIES 
According to Heidegger, the lock-in in one clearing of Being is 
particularly strong because man is not aware of the filtering that is 
at work in this clearing: “Man stands so decisively in subservience 
to on the challenging-forth of enframing that he does not grasp 
enframing as a claim, that he fails to see himself as the one spoken 
to, and hence also fails in every way to hear in what respect he ek-
sists, in terms of his ontological dynamics [Wesen], in a realm 
where he is addressed […].” ([7], p. 332, translation modified) 
After Heidegger had conceived the revealing in the mode of 
enframing as the supreme danger, his text takes an irritating turn. 
He refers to a verse of Hölderlin to declare that “where danger is, 
grows [t]he saving power also.” ([7], p. 333) 
This might seem arbitrary, but Heidegger explains: “The danger 
itself, if it is as the danger, is the saving power.” ([8], p. 41) If the 
danger becomes perceived explicitly as the danger, this might free 
us from the lock-in in enframing: “[W]hen we once open 
ourselves expressly to the ontological dynamics [Wesen] of 
technology we find ourselves unexpectedly taken into a freeing 
                                                                
9 The notion of a local enframing is choosen in order to discard 
two aspects of totality connected to Heidegger’s original 
concept: 1. the planetary dimension of enframing which 
pervades all of the contemporary world and 2. the totality of the 
specific interpretation of reality that Heidegger links to the self-
affirming dynamics of technology. As we can learn from 
Pariser, such dynamics may be restricted to small groups or 
even individuals, and they are not necessarily linked to this 
specific understanding of reality. The point here is not to qualify 
the scope of Heidegger’s cultural diagnostics, but to enhance 
the applicability of the concept for analyzing self-affirming 
dynamics in a variety of concrete technological settings. 
claim.” ([7], p. 331, translation modified) Heidegger seems to 
hope that, as the ontological dynamics of technology become 
more intense, they might also become visible as such: as a 
selective filtering that amplifies established concepts and horizons 
of meaning. 
Self-affirming dynamics are not exclusive to technology but 
denote a danger that always threatens man. Being exposed to the 
potential infinity of possible ways of conceptualizing the world, 
man tends to hold on to those kinds of conceptualizations that he 
already is familiar with: “As ek-sistent, Dasein is insistent.” ([7], 
p. 132) Also for Pariser, the consumption of news that confirm 
one’s own belief existed before the filter bubble. “And while this 
phenomenon has always been true, the filter bubble automates it. 
In the bubble, the proportion of content that validates what you 
know goes way up.”([11], p. 89) 
I want to suggest that the automation of the phenomenon might be 
a crucial point. As the self-affirming dynamics in questions have 
been objectified into software by several different internet 
platforms who offer personalization, and as Pariser has written a 
book about it, the problem has become explicit. In a way, the 
danger now is unconcealed as the danger. Pariser’s aim was to 
render the filter bubble visible, just like Heidegger’s concern was 
whether enframing would reveal itself as such. 
The structural similarities of filter bubble and enframing indicate 
that a useful notion of a local enframing can be developed. 
However, one has to restrain from a premature identification of 
filter bubble and enframing. Instead, the differences of the two 
concepts have to be clarified. Here only a few of these differences 
are exposed in order to raise some productive questions. 
I. One difference is that the filter bubble seems to be an 
epistemological problem, while the enframing is an ontological 
one. The filter bubble defines what we are able to find out about, 
while the clearing of Being ultimately defines what is. This is the 
case, because the filter bubble is not our only access to reality. We 
also find out about things when we are not online. But, in 
contrast, there is nothing outside of the clearing of Being. 
This difference, however, might blur, as we spend more and more 
of our lives online and as the internet begins to colonize our 
offline world with the development of augmented reality. If 
ultimately, as Pariser describes (cf. [11], p. 207ff), our whole lives 
might be absorbed by the filter bubble, would those filters thus 
obtain the ontological totality that Heidegger envisioned? This 
might depend upon whether interactions with other individuals in 
the social sphere might allow us to break through the filters. We 
are thus lead to another important difference. 
II. While, according to Pariser, every individual human being is 
enclosed in its own filter bubble, Heidegger became less and less 
concerned with individuals in the course of his philosophical 
career. After the individualistic “Being and Time”, he came to be 
more occupied with the fate of the Germans as a “historic people”. 
After World War two, when his philosophy of technology took 
shape, he was interested in mankind as such, since he supposed 
that with technology, European thinking had pervaded the whole 
globe. Every individual is enclosed in its own filter bubble, but 
the whole mankind is enclosed in enframing. So while social 
interaction and communication might crash our individual 
bubbles, Heidegger is interested in the basic understandings that 
we all already take for granted and which thus cannot be shaken 
that easily by communication. In particular this is the case for 
understandings which are entailed by the communication 
infrastructures themselves.10 Moreover, it is the case for 
understandings that influenced the design of our communication 
technologies. 
This raises also the question about the relation of individual filter 
bubbles and the ones that pervade the whole society. Filtering 
algorithms are developed and programmed on the basis of certain 
established understandigs and horizons of meaning. As Heidegger 
mentions, the “functionaries” for “making public civilized 
opinion” are “at once driver and driven” ([4], p. 212), they 
constitute understandings and are constituted by them. If one tries 
to follow Pariser’s suggestion and looks for ways to design and 
implement serendipity (cf. [11], p. 235f), one has to be aware: 
Also programming decisions tend to be a result of a filtered 
perception of reality. 
III. There is a certain ambivalence within Pariser’s grasp of the 
problem. Although he generally seems to be concerned about a 
loop that reinforces ones attitudes and interests (as described in 
Section 2), there are also some passages where he seems to be 
worried that the authentic self of the user could become 
manipulated by the filters: “You become trapped in a you loop, 
and if your identity is misrepresented, strange patterns begin to 
emerge, like reverb from an amplifier.” ([11], p. 125) If the 
problem was only that of a misrepresentation of an authentic self, 
then building Popperian falsification strategies into the filtering 
algorithms (cf. [11], p.132ff) might really help. This 
understanding of the problem, however, drops the insight, how 
deeply we are shaped by our language and our technologies. 11 
As he became aware of how fundamentally man was constituted 
by the clearing of Being, Heidegger stopped using his early notion 
of authenticity. “For there is no such thing as a man who is as a 
man singly and solely by his own virtue.” ([7], p. 337, translation 
modified) It is worth noting that Heidegger’s “Question 
Concerning Technology” contains an answer to Werner 
Heisenberg. Heisenberg had described the technological age as a 
condition where man always and everywhere only encounters 
himself (cf. “Das Naturbild der heutigen Physik”, pp. 109-127 in 
[9]). Heidegger objects that man “ek-sists, in terms of his 
                                                                
10 How communication technologies interfere with language 
became an essential question in several of Heidegger’s late 
writings. E.g., in [1], Heidegger addresses the univocity (i.e. the 
suppression of hermeneutic oscillation) that language needs to 
assume in order to become suitable for automated data 
processing. This is an issue that continues to be relevant as the 
semantic web emerges. It might be instructive to discuss 
ontology engineering in the context of Heidegger’s critique of 
metaphysics. 
11 Maybe Pariser’s occasional worries about the manipulation of 
an authentic self express discomfort about the fact that this 
sphere, where man is addressed and constituted, is, to an 
increasing extent, organized according to the interests of private 
and profit-oriented corporations. Pariser calls this “the 
commercialization of everything – even of our sensory 
apparatus itself.“ ([11], p. 215) Doubtlessly, the static self 
produced by filter bubbles is useful for profit-oriented 
enterprises as it makes the behaviour of consumers computable. 
For Heidegger, however, the desire to calculate human 
behaviour is not just an effect of capitalism but rather of the 
cybernetic paradigm in the age of technology. 
 
ontological dynamics [Wesen], in a realm where he is addressed, 
so that he can never encounter only himself.” ([7], p. 332, 
translation modified, emphasis in the original text) The realm 
where he is addressed is the historical clearing of Being which is 
constituted by language and technological artefacts. In this respect 
Heidegger agrees with many contemporary theorists of media and 
technology: There is no authentic pretechnological self. However, 
such a notion of authenticity is not needed as normative concept 
for critique, since the Heideggerian understanding of freedom as 
hermeneutic oscillation provides an alternative normative 
perspective. From this perspective, the identification of self-
amplifying tendencies in our technologies – which is, though on 
different levels, the aim of both Heidegger and Pariser – assumes 
an essential role in any critical inquiry into our evolving online 
media environments. 
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Abstract – One of the possible matters for discussion between Web 
architects and philosophers relies in the use of the term ‘ontology’ by 
the former. Whether many computer scientists declare that their 
‘ontologies’ have nothing to do with the philosophical concept, we must 
note the analogy between their positions and the positions of the 
Logical Positivism in the 1930s. However, drawing a guaranteed lineage 
is extremely difficult. Indeed, in computer science papers, 
bibliographical references to ontologies usually lead to 1991 only. 
Hence, this paper is an ‘inquiry’ in search of a chain of descent from the 
1930s to 1991. 
Keywords – Epistemology, Terminology, Artificial Intelligence, 
Semantic Web. 
Ontologies	  :	  what	  for?	  
The link between the Web and philosophy is not straightforward. However, in 2001, a 
wide audience discovered in Scientific American that: 
A program that wants to compare or combine information across (...) two 
databases has to know that (...) two terms are being used to mean the same 
thing. Ideally, the program must have a way to discover such common meanings 
for whatever databases it encounters. A solution to this problem is provided by 
the third basic component of the Semantic Web, collections of information called 
ontologies. 
(Berners-Lee et al., 2001) 
 
Hence, faced to a mundane computing problem, Web architects summoned a concept – 
or at least a term – from one of the most ancient and arduous domains of western 
philosophy: 
In philosophy, an ontology is a theory about the nature of existence, of what types 
of things exist; ontology as a discipline studies such theories. Artificial intelligence 
and Web researchers have co-opted the term for their own jargon, and for them 
an ontology is a document or file that formally defines the relations among terms. 
The most typical kind of ontology for the Web has a taxonomy and a set of 
inference rules. 
(Berners-Lee et al., 2001) 
Critics	  
The mention of taxonomies briskly worried people who regularly use thesauri and 
classification systems in libraries. According to Clay Shirky, for example, ontologies 
have no reasons to age better than ‘Marxism-Leninism’ category in soviet libraries, or to 
be less ethnocentric than ‘History’ in the Library of Congress headings. Without denying 
the importance of such systems, he thinks that they should be confined to domains in 
which what is described is stable and restricted, in which categories are well formalised 
with clear edges (Shirky, 2005). 
Years before, while some advocated for reusable (Gruber, 1991) or portable ontologies 
(Gruber, 1993) in knowledge bases, our French community of knowledge engineering 
expressed their reluctance to the alleged universality of ontologies: 
The task strongly influence the building of the ontology which, henceforth, cannot 
be portable nor universal. Moreover, this advocates in favor of a non-logical but 
rather constructivist vision of knowledge. (...). As any knowledge, ontologies are 
interpreted by a human expert, depending on the idea he has about the task 
attributed to the system. 
Translated from (Charlet, Bachimont et al., 1996) 
 
Models are not problematic by themselves but by the truth status ones give to them, and 
the last century precisely brought a drastic change in the definition of truth (Léonhardt, 
2008). While truth had been defined since Aristotle as the correspondence to the World, 
its recent redefinition led to modern mathematics and modern sciences (see Figure 1). 
	  
Figure	  1.	  On	  the	  definitions	  of	  truth. 
 
Hilbert's program (1900-1930), by refounding geometry with formal theorems built on 
conventional axioms, publicized the idea that truth in mathematics was a matter of inner 
coherence. This revolution was though greatly prepared by the advent of non-euclidian 
geometries, new imaginary ‘worlds’ that denied the idea that physics and mathematics 
shared the same object. 
From Hilbert's and Poincaré's mathematics, Schlick (1917) inferred that in order to keep 
truth as correspondence in mathematized physics, axioms had to be replaced with 
experimental results. In Kant's terms: synthetic statements could only be a posteriori. 
Dedicated to Schlick, The Scientific Conception of the World – The Vienna Circle (1929) 
followed this trail through by founding “Logical Positivism” at the crossroad of empirism 
and logicism. Paradoxically, the critical impact of the Vienna Circle on modern 
epistemology was through the people on its margins. 
Firstly, Popper (1934), by studying how experimental results and logic could be used 
together to build scientific knowledge, discovered that Schlick's method was indeed an 
induction, a logical fallacy condemned since Aristotle. Instead, he then proposed to build 
scientific method on modus tollens deduction: “if it is false for several, it cannot be true 
for all”. A particular experiment brings knowledge when it refutes a general theory. 
Therefore, while the falseness of a scientific theory can be certain, its truth is always 
hypothetical. Contrary to similar works (Duhem, 1906), Popper's ones had a major 
impact on modern science epistemology. 
Secondly, Wittgenstein (1936), who was one of the early inspirers (1921) of the Vienna 
Circle, publicly denied his prior works. By introducing concepts like “Language games”, 
he clearly gave up the correspondence definition of truth for the coherence one. 
Thirdly, Kuhn (1962), in the Vienna Circle series (International Encyclopedia of Unified 
Science), published a study about scientific revolutions in history. This study, by 
highlighting the social nature of scientific truth, reminded earlier Marxists works about 
the prominent role of communities in science, and opened a new field in the sociology of 
science. 
This short historical incursion in the definitions of truth can help us analyse the status 
given by computer scientists to their ontologies. As an example, Nicola Guarino clearly 
advocates for “truth as coherence” when he claims: 
The general perspective I have in mind is that of Formal Ontology, which can be 
included as the theory of formal distinctions between the elements of a domain, 
independently of their actual reality. 
(Guarino, 1997) 
 
In most of computer science works, the lack of reflection about creating, testing and 
revising ontologies seems to anachronically match the definition of truth advocated by 
Schlick (truth as correspondence to the World), with absolutely no place for knowledge 
construction and refutation. 
On the contrary, some of us think that users of our systems should have the hypothetical 
and intersubjective value of truth in mind. Hence knowledge engineering should provide 
digital spaces for debate between contradictory user-generated viewpoints (Bénel et al., 
2001; Cahier & Zacklad,2001). 
A	  missing	  link	  
We supposed that orthodox ontologists' posture could be explained by a simple 
‘residual’ positivism in the scientific community rather than by a true filiation to Logical 
Positivism. But then, how could we explain the use of the term `ontology’? 
In the English community of knowledge modeling, one of the few authors who refer to 
philosophical readings is John F. Sowa (Sowa, 1992). However, when he used the word 
`ontology’ (Sowa, 2001), it was to criticize fiercely an artificial intelligence that would not 
take into account the failure of Logical Positivism. 
Because it does not seem to be a direct filiation, we will study in the next sections two 
hypothetical trajectories of the idea and term of ‘ontology’. 
In	  search	  of	  heirs	  
The trail of ontology is easy to follow from Greek philosophy to Logical Positivism, but it 
fades after the collapse of the Vienna Circle. Owing to Monique Slodzian's works, we 
know that, at this time in Vienna, a certain Eugen Wüster saw himself as the true heir of 
the Circle. 
Contrary to the original members, Wüster was neither a physicist nor a mathematician, 
nor a logician, nor a philosopher. He was an entrepreneur who saw in the scientific 
program of the Circle the opportunity to solve the communication problem between 
engineers speaking different languages. To address this problem, he defined the 
“General Theory of Terminology”. From language he kept neither verbs nor syntax, but 
only ‘terms’. These terms are structured into what he called himself “an ontology” 
(Slodzian, 2006). 
It is worth noting that Wüster's thesis was entitled “International Language 
Standardization in Technology” (1931) and that he was indeed at the origin of one of the 
ISO commissions. So, between Vienna Circle's program and Wüster's one, the goal had 
significantly changed: while the former did science, the latter did engineering, while the 
former aimed at describing Nature, the latter described artifacts. In the end, the Ontology 
became a nomenclature, and the term a purely conventional symbol (Slodzian, 2006). 
In fact, Wüster's program was not very far from what François Rastier (Rastier, 2010) 
criticizes in “Web Science”, not far either of what Tim Berners-Lee himself states in his 
interview with Harry Halpin and Alexandre Monnin: 
When we design a protocol, we're actually creating... we get the chance to 
actually define the way a new world works. (...) When you create a protocol, you 
get the right to play God, to define what words mean. (...) People (...) have to join 
in, (...) with agreeing. 
Tim Berners-Lee in (Halpin & Monnin, 2010) 
In	  search	  of	  ancestors	  
Another way to draw a lineage from Logical Positivism to the Semantic Web, could be to 
track down references in papers recursively. But here again, the trail fades. 
Bibliographical references to ontologies in computer science papers all leads to a short 
paper by Thomas Gruber (1991). This article itself contains only six references, the 
oldest ones being from the previous year. 
Facing such a dead end, we are reduced to searching for quantitative clues in 
bibliographic databases (see Figure 2). 
	  
Figure	  2.	  Search	  in	  Google	  Scholar	  for	  papers	  containing	  the	  word	  'ontology'. 
 
The first straightforward observation is the geometric growth of the use of the term 
‘ontology’. However this is probably biased by the lack of representativity of digitized 
contents depending on their age, and mostly by the explosion of scientific papers 
numbers in the 20th century. What is greatly more interesting is the evolution in the 
trends witnessed by the names of the most cited authors. 
In the 1930s, at the time of the Vienna Circle, ‘ontology’ is still mainly used in religious 
studies and philosophy of science. The effects of the Vienna Circle show up in the 1940s 
and 1950s with the advent of Quine in the most cited authors. In the 1960s, analytical 
philosophy is overshadowed by phenomenology and reflections on art. It returns to the 
fore in the 1970s, along with a Viennese-inspired linguistics. This trend seems reinforced 
in the 1980s in the form of a ‘computational’ linguistics. Finally, we find Thomas Gruber's 
and Nicola Guarino's knowledge representations in the 1990s and the Semantic Web in 
the 2000s. 
Of course the coarse-grained results of such a quantitative analysis are not quite 
satisfactory. However, we can note that, even if the lineages are still blurry, there is a 
real chronological continuity in the use of the term ‘ontology’ from Logical Positivism to 
computer science. Moreover, it is noteworthy that one of the key links in this continuity 
seems to be Quine. 
Further researches on those who deal with ontologies and conjure up Quine lead us to 
John McCarthy in 1980, the same who introduced the concept of Artificial Intelligence at 
the famous Dartmouth Conference in 1956. According to him, builders of logic-based 
intelligent systems must first “list everything that exists, building an ontology of our 
world” (Smith & Welty, 2001). 
By following the same trail, one discovers that the first to follow this advice was Patrick 
Hayes in 1985. His ontology was for a “naive physics”. The word ‘naive’ was used here 
not in the sense of a simulation of human reasoning in everyday life, but in the sense of 
grasping the world pre-theoretically and reasoning about it formally (Smith & Casati, 
1993). Nowadays, Patrick Hayes is involved in developing RDF-core, SPARQL and 
OWL, three core building blocks of the Semantic Web. 
A	  loose	  link?	  
Thus emerges a direct filiation through Quine and Artificial Intelligence between logical 
positivism and the ontologies of the Semantic Web. However, we must admit that 
Quine's views are rather different from Schlick's. Moreover, matching all of the views of 
Quine with one definition of truth would be difficult as he denied the distinction between 
analytic and synthetic statements, and was even opposed to the idea of a normative 
epistemology. 
To go further, we will focus on Quine's reflections on what there is (1948) and how they 
could have been of interest to McCarthy and his logic-based intelligent systems. In this 
very paper, he openly dismisses the idea that existence would be discovered or 
invented. According to him, reference is not a matter of names but of pronouns(“bound 
variables” in formal logic).In other words, the referent is internal to language. As peculiar 
as this position can be for an ‘ontology’, it had tremendous advantages for the founder of 
Artificial Intelligence: 
• explained in formal logic terms and with continuous references to Frege and Russell, 
it was “ready to use” in logic-based systems, 
• by stating that mathematics was only an example of language, it let think that it could 
be used for all the fields covered by human language. McCarthy was also interested 
in linguists that shared this idea of internal reference (Grice, Searle, etc.). 
It is noteworthy that such an ontology is, as stated by Quine, a ‘myth’ that we are 
committed to believe or not, that we can disagree with, that we can compare with 
another one, but whose truth (or falseness) has little to do with experiments. This may 
explain why, in 1982, when Newell proposed to add a “Knowledge level” to logic-based 
systems, Artificial Intelligence was still so far from real applications and tests 
(Rousseaux & Bouaziz, 2005). This could also explain why the introduction of 
‘knowledge‘ in Artificial Intelligence brought both interesting application fields and 
theoretical confusion on what is an ontology. 
Epilogue	  
This article was an attempt to contribute to the debate about the philosophical status of 
what is called ‘ontologies’ in the Semantic Web. We adopted a ‘genetic’ approach and 
had to go further a bibliographical dead-end in computer science to see if ‘ontologies’ 
could be connected to philosophical works, and in particular with Logical Positivism. Our 
result is that the missing link could be, very likely, Quine, a dissident of Logical 
Positivism, and McCarthy, the founder of Artificial Intelligence. 
This result reveals that the term ‘ontology’ has then a very non-classic meaning: it has 
nothing to do neither with essence nor with experience. Such an ‘ontology’ confers to 
Artificial Intelligence (and then to the Semantic Web) a very speculative status, hardly 
compatible with real-world applications, except at the cost of dangerous theoretical 
trade-offs. 
The questions that remain are why this filiation is not clearly assumed by explicit 
bibliographical references, why the Semantic Web promoters did not reveal what they 
owed to techniques, philosophy and people of the Artificial Intelligence domain. One 
could wonder whether it was not to avoid the arguments that are opposed to this domain 
for forty years (Dreyfus, 1972) and present this kind of approach as a dead end. 
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Abstract 
One of the possible intersections between the Web and Philosophy lies in the use of the term ‘ontology’ by the Web architects. Indeed, 
the term “ontology” belongs to the classical vocabulary of the branch of philosophy called Metaphysics, which is concerned with the 
very nature of the world. Considering the Web as a form of (virtual) world, one could very well apply traditional philosophical 
questions to the stuff of this universe. Is it made of items (datas), processes (actions), or even things? What kind of ontology do we 
need to describe it? In this paper, we will argue that philosophy should focus less on ontology than on logic (namely, semantics) to 
tackle the issue, therefore slightly changing the way the problem is set. We shall take the case of Web Translation as an example. In so 
doing, we will show that a philosophy of the Web is justified to the extent that it somehow plays the role of psychoanalysis of culture, 
beyond the idea of a Critique (Kant) and of a psychoanalysis of knowledge (Bachelard). 
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INTRODUCTION 
Whether the Web is a genuine philosophical object or just another fashionable way to recycle traditional concepts (the Web as a 
“rhizome”), authors (“Deleuze and the Web”), issues (is the Web a “real” world?), or disciplines (aesthetics, ethics, theory of 
knowledge) by applying them to a new (and shiny) domain can hardly be discussed from a general point of view. Rather, it might 
prove more efficient to tackle the problem through the investigation of a precise question (Web translation). In fact, such an inquiry 
will reveal that the metaphysics of the Web hesitate between two different possible orientations –let alone the normative aspects, in 
particular the legal ones (is the Web a public space? Do Web contents constitute a common good? 6). Indeed, one might want to 
question the ontological nature of the Web, its “stuff” as a space of information and a virtual domain of action (digital environment): 
what is it made of? Items (datas, metadatas), processes (actions, operations)? What are their relations? But one might also question the 
relevance of this question, which leads to the current proliferation of ontologies. Isn’t the focus on ontology the symptom of a 
misconceived theory of signification that links meaning to reference (datas) and inference (operations on datas, through metadatas)? A 
critical investigation into semiotics could show that the so-called ontological issue is in fact a semantic one, by unveiling an 
unconscious dimension of the metaphysical problem. 
 
AN ONTOLOGICAL TURN? 
The development of the Web has given way to many attempts of constitution of “ontologies”, to the extent that their multiplication 
may give the impression of a permanent confusion, due to the uncertain nature of the Web individuals (documents, datas, resources?) 
9. Are ontologies the new battlefield of contemporary Web Metaphysics, or just the product of a rational misconception? Could a 
critical inquiry distinguish, in the concept of ontology, what concerns semantic networks (such as WordNet, for instance) and what 
concerns the traditional philosophical issue of the description of the world and of its majors elements (substances, categories, etc.)?  
 
From a historical point of view, even if computer scientists declare that their ‘ontologies’ have nothing to do with the philosophical 
concept, we must note the analogy between their positions and the positions of the Logical Positivism in the 1930s 2. Also, from a 
philosophical perspective, the link between semantics and ontology only seems obvious when word analysis implies the description of 
the world materials; that is: when signification is conceived as directly linked to reference (and sometimes inference, as opposed to 
difference), as it is the case in the logical and grammatical tradition 12. For instance, for Aristotle, words refer to substances and 
accidents, according to a hierarchy that is to be discovered both in the language and the very stuff of being. Now, this lexical 
conception of meaning is precisely the one pervading the WordNet ontological project and its hierarchy between first, second and third 
order entities (from the Aristotelian list of categories, turned into a list of top concepts, to the individuals). The problem with this type 
of onto-logical classification –with the Porphyrian tree, and its wide use of the genus/species difference, as its paradigm– is that it rules 
out competing conceptions of meaning, upon which insists other linguistic tradition. Namely, the rhetorical, hermeneutical (and 
structuralist) approach underlines the importance of interpretation. If representation is the norm of language, then synonyms are a 
problem (how can two words have a different meaning, if they have the same reference?); but if interpretation is central (and not 
subsidiary) to the comprehension of meaning, then the context is to be taken into account, to the extent that there hardly exist any 
synonyms (they are individualized by their concepts). As a consequence, one must consider whether so-called “ontological” disputes 
concerning the Web mean actually anything more than semantic problems. 
 
A LOGICAL (SEMANTIC) INQUIRY 
As François Rastier argues 11, the Semantic Web, as originally designed by Tim Berners Lee after the model of formal ontologies, is 
a hierarchy of hierarchies. Its positivist vision of “datas” therefore only reproduces the above mentionned ambiguities of the referential 
conception of meaning. A proper semantics, on the contrary, could address the difficulties of information retrieval in another way. It 
would imply to conceive the semantic web as a social semantic (or a hermeneutical, or a pragmatic) one 13.  
 
Interpretation, as a meaningful creation process, would not be conceived as secondary (in comparison with a set ontology) but as 
constitutive (along with a dynamic vision of signification) 12, 10. Datas, which are supposedly given, neutral and non-interpretive, 
would be better understood as a complex construction. Instead of pretending to ground Web Semantics on a pile of standardized layers 
(as in the famous “layer cake”), one would rather imagine a flexible Semantics for the Web, consisting of a dynamic process including 
a document (with a testimonial value, submitted to description, revision and signature, according to a particular inquiry), interpretation 
(heuristic modelization), intersubjectivity (rational comparison of different points of view, organization of the conflict of 
interpretation) 1. 
 
These remarks can be particularly well highlighted through the examination of the case of translation. And this is no coincidence. 
Indeed, one must insist on the importance of translation for the philosophy of language. It is an epistemological guide, which reveals 
the central role of interpretation in semantics, and which is all too often neglected by rigid positivist conceptions of meaning (e.g. in 
logical positivism, but also in the computationnalist view of cognition) 8. 
 
WEB TRANSLATION AS A CASE STUDY FOR METAPHYSICS 
According to Gilles-Gaston Granger, the “dream” of Contemporary Reason consists in the desire to create machines that could 
produce singularities 7. For instance, machine translation would –allegedly– automatically produce individualized texts translated 
from an original source into various languages. Now, one has to distinguish between two cases of machine translation: the grammatical 
approach focuses on grammatical rules (as in the original Systran device); the statistical one on most frequent uses (a device made 
recently popular by Google Translate). However, both focuses on regularities rather than on singularities, which are equally important 
in linguistic productions, as the romantic and hermeneutic traditions clearly stated 4,5. In order to get the best of the two worlds, 
many machine translation tools try to combine both regular approaches (as the new Systran). Still, they fail to reach the accuracy of 
human translation. Consequently, most computer assisted translation tools nowadays combine automatic translation with a human 
‘retouch’ device, such as the Google Translation Toolkit, thus providing users with the ability to modify an automatically performed 
translation, while building their own translation memories 14. From a critical perspective, such an evolution is actually not 
surprising, since it is obviously trying to make up for an all too often neglected dimension of language – its creativity. 
 
As Rastier remarks, when people make fun of inadequate automatic translation, they fail to notice that this is less due to the 
performance of the machine than to the inappropriate underlying theory of translation 12. Indeed, if the knowledge of rules is 
required in order to translate, it is however not sufficient. One does not translate from a language to another, but rather from a text to 
another one; and, in so doing, one does transform a system of norms into another one. And these norms cannot be reduced to the 
existence of grammatical or statistical rules, but they also include cultural categories, for instance: genres, styles, centuries, etc. For 
instance, in order to translate a play by Oscar Wilde into Arabic, one must construct an equivalent of the genre “theater” in the Arabic 
culture, where there existed no such thing before the colonial period. 
 
One could therefore imagine to build a computer assisted translation device that would proceed in a different way, starting with human 
translation and using automatisation only for suggestions retrieval: such is the philosophy underlying the TraduXio project 16. One 
does only use the machine to consult the concorder, browsing for relevant segments within a specific set of texts. Such a tool could 
help to build corpora in a reflexive and problem-oriented way, rather than in a merely quantitative perspective 4. Not only does it 
illustrate the idea of a paradigm shift in Artificial Intelligence, switching from Machines that think to Machines that make people think 
1. But it actually stresses the crucial role of interpretation in semantics and, consequently, underlines that the issue at stake in 
“ontologies” is less a truly ontological than a semantic one. 
 
CONCLUSION: WEB PHILOSOPHY AS PSYCHOANALYSIS OF DIGITAL CULTURE 
The Web is a world of meaning, that is: of meaningful documents, and not a set of datas. It is therefore a complex universe that cannot 
be reduced to a composition of atomic items (“simple” datas), which could be organized in a rigid way (fixed “meta-datas”) through 
the identification of robust standards. By unveiling the unconscious aspects of current ontological investigations, philosophy helps to 
convert Web Metaphysics from an ontological problem to a semantic one. The question switches from “What kind of world is a world 
of datas?” to “What is the meaning of these documents and corpora, according to what people do with them?” Hence the idea of a 
socio-semantic or pragmatic Web, based upon the idea of an interpretive semantics. 
 
In so doing, philosophy does not criticize the power of reason in order to avoid confusion between representations and reality per se 
(phenomena and noumena); nor does it aim to limit the dogmatic use of reason by restricting its relevance to its empirical domain. 
Rather, it plays the role of a cultural psychoanalysis, beyond the traditional function of critique (in the Kantian sense) and the idea of a 
psychoanalysis of knowledge (Bachelard), which is tantamount to uncovering the unconscious that pervades the rational conception of 
the world and hinders objectivity. In the case of Web translation, the unconscious fantasy of contemporary reason (after Granger: to 
build machines that could produce singularities) clearly implies a misconception of translation and of semantics itself. Excavating this 
unconscious desire of our reason might help us to understand better our language, and therefore change our vision of the mission and 
scope of its automatic treatment. 
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ABSTRACT 
The naive documentary model behind the Web (a single HTML 
Web page retrieved by a client from a server) soon appeared too 
narrow to encompass all cto account for dynamic pages, content 
negotiation, Web applications, etc. The Semantic Web raised 
another issue: how could we refer to things outside of the Web? 
Roy Fielding’s REST style of architecture solved both problems 
by providing the Web its post-hoc “theory”, making it a resource-
oriented application. Recent evolutions (AJAX, HTML5, Linked 
Data, etc.) and envisioned evolutions (Web of devices, ubiquitous 
Web, etc.) require a new take on this style of architecture. At the 
core of the Web architecture and acting as a unifying concept 
beneath all its facets we find the notion of resource. The 
introduction of resources was very much needed for the Web to 
remain coherent; we now have to thoroughly redefine them to 
espouse its evolutions through time and usages. From the 
definition and the characterization of resources depends our 
abilities to efficiently leverage them: identify, publish, find, filter, 
combine, customize them, augment their affordance, etc. 
Keywords 
Web, resources, architecture of the Web, webarch, hypertext, 
hyperprocess, documentary resource, computational resource, 
rules. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
More and more often, the Web stands between us and the world. 
The Web of documents and data augments our perceptions of 
reality; the Web of applications and services, our grip on reality 
through the tasks we accomplish. It becomes at the same time 
both unavoidable in our daily activities and hardly manageable. 
On the Web, a resource is said to be anything and as the Web 
grows, everything around us is becoming a Web resource indeed. 
This issue was already prevalent with the so-called Web of 
document. The first naive model behind the Web (a single HTML 
Web document retrieved by a client from a server) soon appeared 
too narrow to encompass all existing cases: dynamic pages, 
applets and scripts, content negotiation, Web applications, etc. 
The computational aspect, which at first appeared as an exception 
to the metaphor of the Web-as-a-universal-library, became the 
rule. In addition, the Semantic Web itself raised another issue: 
how could one refer to things outside of the Web? Roy Fielding’s 
REST style of architecture solved both problems by providing the 
Web its post-hoc “theory”, making it a resource-oriented 
application. 
Recent evolutions (AJAX, HTML5, Linked Data, etc.) or even 
envisioned evolutions (Web of devices, ubiquitous Web, etc.) 
require a new take on this style of architecture. At the core of the 
Web architecture, acting as a unifying concept beneath all its 
various facets we find the notion of a resource. The introduction 
of resources was very much needed for the Web to remain 
coherent; we now have to thoroughly redefine them to espouse its 
evolutions through time and usages. From the definition and the 
characterization of resources depends our abilities to efficiently 
leverage them: identify, publish, find, filter, combine, customize 
them, augment their affordance, etc. 
Justin Erenkrantz’ definition of a resource as “a locus of 
computation” in his work on CREST (an computational update of 
REST) and the implications of plastering these loci all over the 
world around us will constitute our starting point in this article. 
It also seems that among the different elements of the Web, the 
Web of linked data (i.e., linked meta-data or structured data) is to 
play an important role here. To manage the diversity of resources 
we can rely on another kind of diversity: the diversity of metadata. 
We believe that by overlaying a Web of semantic descriptions 
over the landscape of resources and by managing these linked data 
by the semantics of their linked schemas, the Web is giving itself 
a distributed and extensible paradigm to model its open pool of 
resources and to process these models. For this reason, we will lay 
the theoretical foundations of our work in this paper with the hope 
of getting closer to producing an ontology of resources based on 
Semantic Web formalisms in order to address many issues that are 
generally considered solely with regards to URIs. 
2. WEB RESOURCES: TURNING THE 
PAGE OF THE DOCUMENTARY WEB 
2.1 Giving names on the Web 
In this first part, we wish to demonstrate that it is possible to 
account for the putative transition between a Web of document 
towards a Web of applications strictly from an architectural point 
of view. Far from being just an historical account of the 
development of the interactive Web, with careful analysis of the 
introduction of JavaScript, the DOM, Ajax-based applications, 
etc., our endeavor will rather be one that aims to show that the 
basic concepts behind the Web and the constraints they entail 
were enough to undergo and even foster these evolutions. 
At the heart of the original architecture of the Web [4] we find 
three basic concepts. 
The first basic concept is the URL [6] or URI [7] [18]. Over time, 
the URI (Universal Resource Identifier) came to be thought of as 
a format of unique identifiers for naming and indicating any 
“resource” on the Web (this understanding of URIs stems from 
the REST style of architecture according to which parts of the 
Web were reinterpreted to cope with predicaments found in 
previous standards). If, in addition, such an identifier gives a path 
to obtain a representation of a resource, then it is also a URL 
(Universal Resource Locator) one of these famous Web 
“addresses” that everyone now knows about, even if, originally, 
they were not to be handled directly by users - e.g. 
"http://www.inria.fr/" is the URI(L) of INRIA home page. We 
could immediately note here that although these so-called 
addresses were initially not intended to be really used by humans, 
they are now part of our daily communications up to the point that 
there exists a market where they’re valued and exchanged. Also, 
rather than addresses, which is actually a different concept, URLs 
should be understood as belonging to a subset of URIs, those 
URIs that are deferenceable. After all, URLs do not just locate 
representations, they retain the relation of identification between 
URIs and resources and add another relation, of access, to 
representations.  
The second fundamental concept is the HTTP protocol [12] 
which allows for instance a client (e.g. a Web browser) to request 
a representation of the resource identified and “located” by a URL 
and get in return either the data of the resource representation or 
an error code indicating a problem, e.g. the famous 404 error 
indicating that the page you requested was not found. We should 
stress that the HTTP protocol does not only enable one to GET a 
representation but also to POST a new one, PUT an updated 
version or DELETE it. 
The third fundamental concept was the HTML language to 
represent, store and communicate the representation(s) of the 
famous Web pages. It has ever since been complemented by other 
languages using an XML syntax to exchange any kind of 
structured data or document, one of the dialects of XML being a 
syntax for RDF, the linked data framework and core graph model 
of the Semantic Web. 
All three basic concepts of the Web are especially important given 
that any current extension of the Web, including the Web of data, 
is fundamentally based on the first two concepts to identify the 
subject of data exchanged (URI) and transfer the data (HTTP). 
Indeed, the keystone of the architecture of the Web of data is the 
same as the classic Web: namely, the standard URI naming 
mechanism. However, unlike the documentary Web in which 
relationships are formed between anchors in hypertext documents, 
relationships in the Web of data are typed links (where types 
themselves are identified by URIs) between arbitrary resources 
(also identified by URIs). By relying on (HTTP) URIs for naming, 
on the HTTP protocol for data transfer, on the RDF graph model 
(instead of HTML) to describe and link resource, and on shared 
schemas, the recommendations of the Semantic Web outline an 
architecture for the world-wide interconnection of data sources 
and models. 
2.2 Identity crisis 
Yet, much work was needed to reach a shared agreement over the 
most basic building blocks of the Web. Standards for identifiers, 
for instance, evolved over time, from the first UDI draft [4] and 
URI specification [5] during the pre-W3C era (when the 
fundamentals of the Web were not yet clearly distinguished from 
their implementations) to the first standards concerning URLs and 
URNs (non-dereferenceable proper names), up until the latest URI 
RFCs. The work accomplished by Roy Fielding with the REST 
style of architecture [13] [14] was instrumental in reshaping the 
understanding both of Web identifiers and the HTTP protocol. It 
is also in Fielding’s thesis that resources are defined for the first 
time. An immediate practical result consequence of REST was the 
fusion of what had previously been sundered between URLs and 
URNs back into URIs in 1997-1998 [29] [6]. French sociologist 
Laurent Thévenot [31] summarizes the agency of standards by 
explaining that they are “forms” that aim to generalize, extend, 
stabilize and equate a given technical reality. This is exactly what 
the Web achieved through REST and the recommendations it 
inspired.  
Around the same time (19997-1998), other standards, the first 
explicitly dedicated to the Semantic Web, appeared. This 
conjunction is not really surprising considering that the Web had 
reached an unprecedented state of maturity. A “new” problem 
then seemed to arise. Formerly known as the httprange-14 [27] 
[19] – now issue-57 [20] – it consisted in understanding how one 
could distinguish between URIs that identify so-called 
“documents” and those that identify “things”1. This distinction 
itself was rephrased in terms of “information resources” (IR) and 
“non-information resources” (NIR) – with no real investigation 
with regards to whether or not these distinctions were tantamount 
to one another.  
Basically, the httprange-14 may be summed up as an attempt to 
find the technical means to distinguish between IR and NIR by 
relying on the HTTP header sent by a server to a client in a typical 
HTTP negotiation. Actually, it is difficult to discuss the httprange-
14 from a purely technical point of view since it has become 
marred with conflicting interpretation over time. What the 
httprange-14 actually says is that a 200 header will be followed by 
a representation, a 303 by a URI that identifies a second resource 
and is supposed to give access to a representation through a 200 
header, and both 4XX and 5XX responses do not give access to 
anything. 
 
Table 1: Summary of the Http-range14 
HTTP code Result Indication 
200 (OK) 
(HTTP) 
representation 
IR (and NIR?) 
303 (See 
Other) 
URI Any kind of resource 
                                                                
1 “Well, things and their descriptions are not the same and when 
people started using URIs to make assertions (using RDF, on 
the Semantic Web) they wanted to be able to say both 
http://cities.example.org/oaxaca  has a radish festival every year 
on December 23rd and http://cities.example.org/metadata/ 
oaxaca.html was written by Raphael Sabattini” [32]. 
4XX 
5XX 
Error message 
Impossible to guess 
anything 
 
One could infer, just by looking at the columns titles of Table 1, 
that the httprange-14 eschews in proving anything since the 
second column only contains HTTP-representations and URIs in 
the case of redirection (or error messages) while the third column, 
indicating what can be inferred from the previous one, is left open 
to interpretation. If resources are just “shadows” or “concepts” 
[14], then both information and non-information resource cannot 
be distinguished in terms of their potential accessibility: only 
representations being accessible by definition, not resources2. 
Hence, the first two rows of the third column will technically 
contain both IR and NIR.  
However, this has not been the default interpretation. What the 
httprange-14 was supposed to provide was a clear separation 
between IR and NIR. The technical solution advocated failed to 
achieve that goal for the aforementioned reasons. Therefrom, a 
normative reading of the header responses was promoted instead 
of the more circumscribed technical solution first envisioned. 
Whenever a 200 header is served, says that reading, what we get 
is an IR. NIR are served indirectly, through a 303 header, by 
redirecting to an IR whose representations are then accessed by a 
client. The debate then focused on the relevance of this construal, 
mainly motivated by the need felt to determine whenever a URI 
identifies a document or a “thing” (our answer being that in both 
cases it identifies a resource, in accordance with the fundamentals 
of webarch).  
Instead of just a technical relation, redirection thus became a good 
practice advocated in the publication NIR. While httprange-14 
had completely failed as a purely technical tool, a normative 
reading was still possible. Many are still deterred by the difficulty 
of implementing redirection on a broad scale. That is why a new 
issue was opened by the TAG: 
 
At their meeting in 16th July 2007 [1] the TAG resolved 
to create a new issue, HttpRedirections-57, as a 
response to a community request [2] that we give 
further consideration to the use of the HTTP 303 status 
codes *and* other possible mechanisms of obtaining a 
description of a resource (typically a non-information 
                                                                
2 This is not always understood, as evidenced in RFC 3986 [18] 
where one can read “A Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) is a 
compact sequence of characters that identifies an abstract or 
physical resource [our emphasis].” No resource is physical per se 
yet if a resource is “the semantics of what the author intends to 
identifies [our emphasis]” [14], as defined in REST, then it can be 
said that what one intends to identify this way is a physical thing, 
though the resource itself won’t. This distinction has been put 
forward to full scrutiny in order to better understand resources in 
[23] It is interesting to note that the httprange-14 was somehow 
theoretically fixed before the advent of the Semantic Web when as 
soon as the notion of resource was contrived to make sense of the 
Web departing from an understanding of “Web pages” as static 
documents. It is the focus on documents that again was the cause 
of the identity crisis. The fact that resources can be anything (as 
long as it is identified by a URI) also made it possible to build the 
Semantic Web on top of URIs as a mean to identify any resource 
(not just document) and link to it. 
resource) where the referenced resource is not capable 
of providing representations of itself.3 
 
Echoing the AWWSW report, the issue really is about URI 
“definition”, especially within RDF context:  
 
“When a URI appears in an RDF statement, how can the 
reader of that statement determine the author's intended 
meaning? What RDF triples characterize that meaning? 
Where does the meaning come from? How should the 
meaning be determined, particularly in the context of 
the HTTP protocol, for an http URI? Can we codify a 
suite of nose-following methods for semantic web use -- 
a recipe one can follow in order to obtain a canonical 
graph (or "definition", "description resource", "URI 
documentation") for a URI?”4 
 
Rather than following that trail and search for additional ways of 
materializing the “meaning” of a URI, we would like to make 
sense of the existing Web by showing its fundamental coherence, 
accounting for both the Web of document and the Web of 
applications (current webarch discussions focusing more on the 
RDF side of things). This will require of a close examination of 
what is called a “resource”, a task that can no longer be deferred 
for the purpose of reaching a solution.  
3. ONLINE COMPUTATIONAL LOCI: 
FROM LIBRARIAN REFERENCES TO 
LOCUS OF COMPTATIONS 
Everything was there from the start; in fact the Web was never 
purely documentary. At least if we are to take seriously the 
fundamentals of its architecture (and by doing so, lots of problem 
would simply not appear in the wild).  
Looking at the definition of a resource, one can distinguish 
between three elements: a resource; the state of a resource; and 
the representational state. We shall examine each of these three 
elements in turns. 
a) Resources 
According to RFC 2396 [7], a resource can be anything. Roy 
Fielding called it a “shadow” or a “concept”, thus making a strong 
distinction between resources and documents (even a digital one, 
understood, ultimately, as a binary set of 1 and 0 physically 
hosted somewhere). By definition, resources can never be 
accessed and are only manipulated through their representations 
(see [14], one section of paramount importance in their paper is 
fittingly entitled “Manipulating Shadows”). 
b) States of a resource 
Resources have states. While resources remain the same (or at 
least should, since that is a normative statement which is 
contradicted on a daily basis), they also carry different results 
over time in terms of the representations that can be served to give 
information about them. One must thus distinguish between a 
resource and its state(s). This echoes the well-known distinction 
between rules and their applications. Alexandre Monnin [23] has 
previously suggested to understand resources as rules, thus 
specifying Fielding’s claim that resources are concepts (it should 
be noted that concepts are often treated as rules in the 
philosophical literature). Assimilating the resource to a rule 
                                                                
3 Cf. [20]. 
4 Cf. [3]. 
allows to better understand how and why states are produced. 
Basically, a resource generates states: over time (Web pages 
evolve, just as the result of search engine queries or application 
results in general) or punctually, through content negotiation 
(abbreviated as “conneg”). 
Of course, some cases seem at odd with this construal. Is Tim 
Berners-Lee a rule? Of course not. But a rule/resource being a 
means to identify Tim Berners-Lee, it will always depend on the 
way one individuates that “thing”. It could be either “the founder 
of the Web”, “the overall Director of the W3C” or “a man born of 
X and Y” (this is actually the Kripkean way of identifying people 
through across possible worlds despite the claim that rigid 
designators are adverse to definite descriptions), etc. Eventually, 
these are three different resources, or, in other words, three 
different objects, three different ways to pick-up something.  
It is especially important make this distinction since nothing 
warrants that a resource will adequately correspond to a “real 
thing” in the world simply because it has been published on the 
Web; even more so since the goal of the Semantic Web is not to 
find a way out of this issue5. Resources need not always 
correspond to definite description but at least they must have 
enough content to specify what “an author intends to identify” 
[14]. This identification is thus possible by means of rules, 
corresponding to resources on the Web.  
Even if the Semantic Web is to be conceptualized as a Web of 
“entities” (a characterization we borrow from the OKKAM 
project6 [9], [30]), many of these entities are in fact the result of a 
complex publishing process that begins with people who edit 
Wikipedia and agree by consensus to identify something 
somehow. This is at least how DBpedia7, one of the most 
successful applications of the Semantic Web, works.  
We must accept once and for all the fundamentals of webarch. 
Fortunately, the architecture of the (Semantic) Web is no theory 
of truth. By contrast, it happens to be fuelled by a very different 
notion, trust. A paramount factor of trust is who the publisher of a 
resource is, whence the importance of provenance on the Web. 
All these elements, that were traditionally associated with the 
epistemic dimension of knowledge and dissociated from the 
ontological dimension, are now clearly intermeshed on the Web. 
For instance, as a telling fact that should not surprise us, it should 
be stressed that the definition of a resource given by Roy Fielding 
and Richard Taylor [14] doesn’t shy away from mentioning the 
intention of an author – perhaps better described as one or more 
publishers in this context. A resource is thus always, at least 
partly, an intentional object, or rather what we’d call an 
institutional object, to better cope with the public nature of 
publication on the Web and its technical environment, both 
aspects corresponding to what is hereinafter referred to as the 
editorial and computational commitments. 
c) The representational states of a resource 
                                                                
5 As Larry Masinter explains in a presentation entitled 
“Philosophy” of the Web”, delivered at PhiloWeb 2012, WWW 
2012 workshop in Lyon, France, http://www.slideshare. 
net/PhiloWeb/larry-masinter-philoweb): “Naming is printing 
money”. One just has to remember that money can also be 
counterfeit, and the Semantic Web has not been designed to sort 
between genuine and counterfeit. 
6 http://www.okkam.org/ 
7 http://dbpedia.org/About 
States remain abstract, just as resources, not accessible as such. 
What can be accessed is the HTTP-representation of the state of a 
resource. It can also be of various formats and many 
representations can be served for a given resource. While the 
latter need not be identical, they should at least be all faithful to a 
given resource. In other words, all of them must be computable as 
acceptable states (i.e., applications of the rule) of a resource (i.e., 
rule).  
If my resource is “the original text of Shakespeare’s MacBeth”, a 
French translation in HTML will not do as faithful representation. 
This case illustrates a simple yet important fact: even the Web 1.0 
was a Web of resources. Something that hasn’t changed today, 
despite the advent of the Web of applications. 
We thus adhere to Justin Erenkrantz’ definition of resources as 
“loci of computation” as exposed in his work on the CREST style 
of architecture [11]. With a slight difference, since we also firmly 
believe that such a definition is true for the Web in general, not 
just the Web of applications. Erenkrantz’ words fit very well 
within the general picture we try to draw where resources are 
rules when he uses the expression “network continuation” to 
describe them, thus underlying the dual aspect of stability and 
change8 that essentially characterizes them. 
4. WEB OF LINKED COMPUTATIONAL 
RESOURCE 
It is commonly admitted to attach a version number to the Web, 
like 1.0, 2.0, 3.0, squared, etc., so that people may eventually 
come to think that there are several implementations of the Web. 
This is clearly misleading. Actually, we are still not using the full 
potential of what Tim Berners Lee had originally envisioned in 
the early nineties. In fact, rather than characterizing the Web, 
                                                                
8 A major modification to this equilibrium would be the 
introduction of a new HTTP method to improve the red-write 
aspect of the Web, namely the PATCH one as described in a 
proposed standard, RFC 5789 [10]: “The PATCH method 
requests that a set of changes described in the request entity be 
applied to the resource identified by the Request-URI”. Despite 
the lack of clear enough separation between resources and 
representations (for simplicity reasons and probably as an 
heritage of WebDAV conceptualization, though it certainly has 
the adverse consequence of partially excluding content 
negotiation. Rather than treat resources as modifiable files on a 
server, fitting mechanisms should be developed to apply updates 
on one kind of representations and spread it to others so as to 
preserve conneg). The idea behind this RFC and earlier 
proposals (including RFC 2068) is of great magnitude since it 
explicitly opens up the possibility that modifications applied to 
representations explain how resources may change over time 
(for instance, the URI identifying a given question about X on 
Stacked Overflow once it has been properly answered will 
thereafter identify a-question-about-X-that-has-been-answered-
and-is-now-closed, prompting a very different attitude that 
translates in the set of potential actions made available to users 
by publishers (answering will no longer possible as perusing 
becomes the main available task, archiving will become the 
publisher’s goal, etc.). In an interactive Web of applications 
prompting responses from users, such possibilities may become 
the norm, thus making it necessary to reassess what counts as 
“cool URIs”. 
 
these notations seem to betoken the (limited) grasp that we still 
have of it.  
Up until recently, many industries were not ready to bring the 
Web to its full potential, nor were many computer scientists. 
Therefore when we talk about "documentary resources", one 
should really understand "the documentary application and 
understanding of Web resources". 
Figure 1 emphasizes the differences between the first Web of 
documentary resources versus the current Web of computational 
resources. Of course, this distinction is mostly didactic. In 
practice, things are not so neatly and conveniently separated and, 
as we said, most of what we discover these days was here from 
the start. But for our purpose it is convenient to have a look at the 
“evolution of Web understanding”. This approach allows us to 
highlight how much practices changed the structure of the Web. 
 
Figure 1: From Hypertext to Hyperprocess on a micro, meso 
and macro level. 
In this section we propose a three-level analysis of the "Web of 
Computational Resource" (CoReWeb). The micro level focuses 
on the resource itself and its inner mechanisms. The meso level is 
about relations and interactions between computational resources. 
The macro level highlights the relations between the editorial 
policy of a publisher and the way he manages his Web resources. 
4.1 Resources and other rules 
Web resources are often published as part of bigger sets of 
resources that have in common to be named and managed by the 
same publisher. We consider that an editorial policy can be 
summarized as a structured rule set. Some of these rules are 
generic, others are specific and can inherit or be related to broader 
ones. From this, we assert that any Web resource formally 
expresses the intersection of several of these publishing rules. 
In other words, a Web resource is situated at the intersection of a 
number of publishing rules. A URI then gives access to a 
representational state that is the result of this intersection and its 
closure, while it is often perceived as identifying ony the most 
specific rule involved in generating the aforementioned 
representational state (otherwise known as “the” resource).  
Indeed, the very way by which Web resources are cut out depends 
on their being distinguished from one another and included in a 
common set, an editorial ecosystem generally known as a 
“website” – even though such a notion bears little sense according 
to webarch. Actually, the set-theoretic approach, as found in the 
W3C recommendation POWDER ([1], [2]) allows to treat 
websites and RESTful Web services or data stores the same way: 
as “irisets” (in facts, sets of resources rather than IRIs, but the 
former are only manipulable as sets of IRIs9 – groupings of 
resources identified by IRIs/URIs).  
To borrow an analogy from linguistics, the “signified” in 
Saussure’s theory is specified by relations of difference. By 
contrast, resources do share some common traits: they link to one 
another, to external resources, as mashups include parts of other 
resources, follow a given publishing policy being organized under 
specific categories, hierarchy, etc. Or, alternatively, in the case of 
Semantic Web resources, follow various axioms, share sets of 
properties and objects, etc. Yet, eventually, each must have a 
specific content distinguishing it from its neighbors. A resource is 
precisely this modicum atom of content that is supposed to remain 
stable, at least as much as possible, especially from a publisher’s 
point of view, whereas representations as well as editorial policies 
do endure modifications (albeit allegedly much less often 
regarding the latter). 
Here it may be useful to appeal to the distinction proposed by 
T.V. Raman [24], between “Web components” and “Web 
container”: 
“(...) the need to provide a single point of access to oft-
used information led to portal sites that aggregated all 
the information onto a single Web page. In this context, 
the various items of information can be viewed as 
lightweight Web components. The environment in 
which these components are hosted (such as the 
software that generates and manages the Web page) can 
be viewed as a Web container. Thus, common actions 
(such as signing in) were refactored to be shared among 
the various Web applications hosted by the Web 
container, a piece of software managing the user’s 
browsing context.” 
 
Those rules reflect the editorial policy of a “website”. For 
instance, this includes whether actions such as sharing content on 
a social network or using one’s account to sign up or log in to a 
third-party website as well as being given the possibility to push 
the Facebook “like” button or Google’s “+1” are made available. 
Such cases correspond to the integration of modular components, 
the grouping of which (and other editorial rules previously 
mentioned) gives rise to a Web container. Components and 
containers10 may or may not be identified for themselves (a 
Facebook component might have one or more URIs while, by 
contrast, the decision to link a page to other pages “inside” a 
given container will not). 
In any case, both containers and components are akin to non-
necessary rules which add to a resource specific content enough 
                                                                
9 See [9]: “A Resource Set is defined in terms of the IRIs of 
resources that are its members.”  
10 We are using those words in a broader sense than as mere 
equivalents of “portlets” and “servlets”. Many examples are given 
in section 4.1.2 (“Meso level”). 
details to compute concrete http-representations (the software 
used, HTML code, Web server headers and configurations, CSS 
style sheets, the JavaScript it includes, the JSP or PHP tags it uses, 
etc.). In other words, the policies or pieces of code that will 
generate a desired effect without belonging to the core-definition 
of a resource – i.e., without being confused with what a URI 
specifically identifies.  
On the Web, attending to editorial policies and rules can either be 
done by one or many people. Since these tasks can be separated 
and often are in concrete situations, it is crucial to have them 
clearly distinguished from the inception. 
4.1.1 Micro level 
Technical evolutions have impacted both servers and clients. At 
the beginning, browsers were the only Web clients but now, we 
have many devices and applications that are able to connect to the 
Web and to get data and services from it. 
Web servers were originally designed to propose a hypertext 
experience of "filesystem-like" remote services. Since the 
common gateway interface (CGI) their structure became 
increasingly complex. Nowadays, servers are able to negotiate 
with clients to adjust the response so that most of the content is 
generated on the fly. Any Web server is also compatible with at 
least one programing language that can trigger the processing of 
very sophisticated tasks that sometimes involve other remote 
services. 
This point has important consequences on what is downloaded 
from those servers. One of the defined rationales behind 
documentary resources is that people have tried to preserve the 
causal pathway between a reference and an informational 
content, because it was constitutive of all our "real world" 
documentary reference systems. The “transition” from 
documentary resource to computational resource made more 
obvious that this artificially preserved causal relation had been 
broken. Now the downloaded content is what [17] called a “Web 
representation” of the resource, and can change each time a 
resource is invoked. The documentary location has been replaced 
by a locus of computation, or what we would call a space of 
invocations. 
Times at which “pages” were written with authoring tools like 
Adobe Dreamweaver or Microsoft Word now seem long gone. 
Today, blogs and wikis have permeated the Web and old-
fashioned authoring practices are withering. From the server point 
of view, it is much more complicated to host a blog than a set of 
HTML files and CSS style sheets. Online editing tools involve 
scripting language capabilities, database and adequate security 
policies with possibly multiple ports opened to connect remote 
services, authentication API keys, etc. 
To enable the Web of Data, the W3C have made slight changes in 
the specifications of Web architecture. URLs are now considered 
as (dereferenceable) URIs. From a linked data perspective, every 
URI minter/resource publisher is indeed strongly encouraged to 
make them dereferencable, so that it is possible to navigate 
between RDF concepts in the same manner as between pages. The 
303 HTTP code is used to inform the "concept browser" that the 
resource he is asking for is not "informational". Hence, the 
technical distinction between Web pages, Web services and RDF 
concepts is no longer a valid one (our subsequent use of the 
received expression “Web pages” – or rather HTTP-
representations – is entirely motivated by this observation). 
URLs were initially locating documentary resources. CGI and 
REST have turn URLs into RPC passing parameters to scripts or 
web services. Now every URL is, and in a sense has always been, 
a URI. URI are identifying protean resources that can turn 
themselves in any format required by the client. Such are the 
computational resources. 
Like with any program, to manipulate a computational resource, 
one has to implement an algorithm with a programing language, a 
conceptual model and data. Each of these parts has a strong 
impact on those Web representations a user can browse or a 
program parse. 
As said before, a resource is a formal translation of necessary and 
non-necessary publishing rules but these rules themselves can 
change, the implementation can evolve to match a new 
technological context, a bug can be fixed, a new feature added, the 
database can also be updated with fresh data, etc. There are many 
reasons for Web representations to change and that is the real 
communicative power of the Web: an editor can instantly adapt 
the whole editorial chain synchronously in accordance with any 
informational or technological constraints. 
The growth of Web communication in the last fifteen years 
resides mostly in the quickness with which information can pass 
from the state of data stored in one or more remote databases to a 
Web representation. Thus, the ease of update of the publication 
chain on a global scale induced by the architecture of the Web 
constitutes its greatest value and its biggest breach with previous 
editorial practices. 
4.1.2 Meso level 
As we have seen, through HTTP, any computational resource is 
likely to refer to  other resources or communicate with them. This 
capability was exploited to add dynamicity and real-time content 
to Web pages, but it also has many applications in the Web of 
data. 
4.1.2.1 Extending the pages communication 
capabilities 
In 1995, Java applets were the first practical manner to 
asynchronously load remote content into Web pages. One year 
later, Microsoft introduced the iframe element designed to allow 
webmasters to include one Web page into another one. In 1999, 
the first XMLHTTP ActiveX control appeared with IE5. Now 
every browser proposes asynchronous communication capabilities 
and this technology, commonly known as AJAX for 
"Asynchronous JavaScript and XML", is very widely used.  
Many widgets do use AJAX to connect a remote Web server and 
include real-time changes into the displayed content of a Web 
page. Real-time charts of stock exchange ratings, news tickers, 
Google maps, Google trends are just a few examples of 
applications using AJAX. 
But with HTML5 and the brand new Websocket JavaScript API, 
things are going even further. Whereas AJAX is asynchronous 
(connections are closed after the server response is received), 
websockets provide persistent connection capabilities to Web 
pages, a feature that used to be characteristic of low level 
programming languages. Other evolutions like IndexedDB and 
WebGL APIs contribute even more to transform Web Pages into 
complex Web Applications [23]. Persistent connections enable the 
development of real-time applications, such as collaborative real-
time painting or 3D games.  
4.1.2.2 Public APIs, Dashboards, Widgets, Mashups 
With the spread of Service-Oriented Architectures and the 
standardization of RPC (Remote Procedure Call) protocols, the 
Web offers a wide pool of public services any Web developer can 
draw from to build innovative applications. These services can 
either be requested directly, or, more often, they provide widgets 
that should be integrated in Web pages.  
Since 2005, many dashboard applications have emerged, like 
Netvibes11, but quickly Google12, Yahoo!13 and Microsoft14 
released their own dashboards providing a large variety of widgets 
like calendars, mail, contacts, todo lists, RSS readers, financial or 
weather survey tools.  
Entire frameworks, like Life Ray15 have been developed to build 
such platforms where the user can compose his own page made of 
portlets16. 
Now dashboard applications seem to wither in favor of more 
flexible widgets that can integrate into any page. It is impossible 
to reference them all here, so we will limit ourselves to some 
typical examples: 
- Data visualization 
Using either REST or SOAP protocols, it is now common to 
compose complex processing chains made of multiple remote 
service calls. The most typical combination is to provide a data 
stream to a visualization service and to integrate it into a Web 
page. As an example, one can mention Wordle17, Many Eyes18 or 
Google Maps19. 
- Mashups 
A mashup is the result of the combination of several sources of 
information like RSS feeds. Yahoo! Pipes20 is the best-known 
mashup application and his cousin, DERI pipes21, includes 
semantic features. Other examples include 123People22, a 
personal information aggregator and the Twitter API which gave 
birth to lots of applications like Bubble-T23, Polemic Tweet24... 
- URL shortener 
With the Twitter's 140 characters restriction, URLs were often too 
long to be posted. To that purpose shortening services have 
appeared like TinyURL25 and Bit.Ly26. Both provide a public API 
to get a short URL from a longer one. These very simple services 
are among the most used on the Web and within many Twitter 
clients. 
                                                                
11 http://www.netvibes.com/  
12 http://www.google.com/  
13 http://my.yahoo.com/  
14 http://live.com  
15 http://www.liferay.com/  
16 http://www.jcp.org/en/jsr/detail?id=286  
17 http://www.wordle.net/  
18 http://www-958.ibm.com/software/data/cognos/manyeyes/  
19 https://maps.google.com/  
20 http://pipes.yahoo.com/pipes/  
21 http://pipes.deri.org/  
22 http://www.123people.com/  
23 http://dev.fabelier.org/bubble-t/  
24 http://polemictweet.com/  
25 http://tinyurl.com/  
26 https://bitly.com/  
- Translation services 
For those who wish to get their Web page automatically translated 
in any language, Microsoft, Yahoo! and Google have published 
their solutions: Bing Translation API27, Google Translation28 and 
Yahoo! Babelfish translation service29. The final representation 
visualized by the user is thus the application of their web service 
to an initial Web representation that could itself call on many 
other Web resources. 
- Currency conversion 
It can be useful to delegate to a remote service the task of 
currency conversion according to current exchange rates. This is 
the purpose of web services like Exchange Rate API30 or Open 
source exchange rates31. 
4.1.2.3 Web services orchestration and 
choreography 
For people wishing to build much more complex services 
compositions from middleware architectures, to model Business 
processes as compositions of atomic tasks and to execute these 
compositions as single processes, several standards have been 
released by the W3C allowing what is called “service 
orchestration” and “service choreography”32 [21] [28]: 
An orchestration specifies an executable process that 
involves message exchanges with other systems, such 
that the message exchange sequences are controlled by 
the orchestration designer. A choreography specifies a 
protocol for peer-to-peer interactions, defining, e.g., the 
legal sequences of messages exchanged with the 
purpose of guaranteeing interoperability. Such a 
protocol is not directly executable, as it allows many 
different realizations (processes that comply with it).33 
 
Therefore resources are not only related to each other by 
navigation or composition links. They are nested into a much 
more complex interaction network mostly based on remote 
procedure calls and data exchange between servers. Consequently, 
qualifying the Web as a hypertext seems a little bit outdated. That 
is why we would prefer the term hyperprocess (actually, REST, 
by turning webarch into a resource-oriented architecture already 
                                                                
27 http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ff512419.aspx  
28 https://developers.google.com/translate/v2/getting_started  
29 http://babelfish.yahoo.com/free_trans_service  
30 http://www.exchangerate-api.com/howto  
31 http://josscrowcroft.github.com/open-exchange-rates/  
32 In [15], we find an attempt to account for the client-server 
dialog mechanism both in the context of Web pages and Web 
services in a logical way in order to type the processes involved; 
in other words, so as to be able to determine whether “two 
processes that interact may be checked before the interaction”. 
The Curry-Howard correspondence ensures that these logical 
types correspond to Web processes. While especially relevant to 
our own computational approach, by treating all URIs as URLs, 
and URLs as pointers in computing languages, it has the severe 
drawback of being oblivious to the fact that the Web is a 
publishing platform whom identifiers have two functions, none 
of which can be ignored. 
33 Source : http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_Process_Execut 
ion_Language#The_BPEL_language  
had the immediate effect of discarding this notion of hypertext 
making it fully inappropriate for the Web; despite the enduring 
popularity of the word, it remains largely deprived of meaning in 
this context). 
4.1.3 Macro level 
On the one hand, and fortunately for Web users, the increasing 
complexity of server infrastructures, was progressively outsourced 
under the responsibility of specialized companies that provide 
hosting and administration services at low cost. The improvement 
of virtualization and monitoring technologies has also greatly 
simplified such system administration tasks. 
On the other hand, it is more and more difficult for publishers to 
ensure a good quality of service throughout the entire processing 
chain. The technological stack and the processes involved in 
publishing a resource have become so complex and so distributed 
that it is becoming harder and harder to ensure a strict editorial 
commitment because as the Web grows in diversity, this 
commitment has turned into a computational one.  
From the societal point of view, content publishers whose main 
activity was to produce content and to guarantee the quality of 
information now have to deal with various new constraints owing 
to the specificity of the medium. Beyond the increasing rate of 
publication, publishers must also face new stringent public 
expectations in terms of technical quality of service and 
interoperability. 
Facebook, Twitter, Delicious and Google have imposed their 
"social ranking" tools ("I like" button, Google "+1", "Retweet") to 
publishers who must embrace these technologies otherwise they 
risk losing customers. Publishers must also consider the growing 
number of devices that people use to access information: 
smartphones, tablets, Kindle, television... The outsourcing of 
network infrastructures and servers adds another intermediate in 
the decision chain, which further complicates delivering a good 
quality of service. Browsers now even include calls to the cloud to 
delegate part of the rendering... 
In summary, the gradual evolution from hypertext to hyperprocess 
has progressively added to the constraints of an editorial 
commitment those of a computational commitment. 
5. CONCLUSION – TOWARD 
UBIQUITOUS HYPER-RESOURCES 
The Web was already very rich with regards to the variety of the 
multimedia resources it hosted and linked to, and this richness is 
still increasing. With the advent of the mobile Web and the 
Internet of Things, we are going toward Web-augmented reality, 
ubiquitous Web and a Web of things or objects. 
But while the Web is augmenting our reality, the objects and 
places of our lives, the latter are in turn increasing the number and 
variety of Web resources. This evolution will come with a price, 
namely an increase in the complexity of Web resources and their 
dependencies. 
The architecture of the Web of data and the models of the 
Semantic Web may provide a way to match the diversity of online 
resources by means of a framework of metadata designed to 
annotate Web resources and exploit the semantics of their 
schemas to process them intelligently. Metadata and their schemas 
could be the keystone of the new resource-centric Web 
applications, their integration and interoperability. 
It is conceivable that tomorrow, he who controls metadata on the 
Web controls Web resources, and through them a lot of things. 
 
Figure 2: Synthetic view of the resource-centric Web 
architecture and the cross-cutting importance of metadata (as 
found in [16]). 
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ABSTRACT
The explosion of semantic data on the information web, and
within digital philosophy, requires new techniques for orga-
nizing and linking these knowledge repositories. These must
address concerns about consistency, completeness, mainte-
nance, usability, and pragmatics, while reducing the cost
of double experts trained both in ontology design and the
target domain. Folksonomy approaches address concerns
about usability and personnel at the expense of consistency,
completeness, and maintenance. Upper-level formal ontolo-
gies address concerns about consistency and completeness,
but require double experts for the initial construction and
maintenance of the representation. At the Indiana Phi-
losophy Ontology (InPhO) Project, we have developed a
general methodology called dynamic ontology, which alle-
viates the need for double experts, while addressing con-
cerns about consistency, completeness and change through
machine learning over a domain corpus, and concerns about
usability and pragmatics through human input and seman-
tic web standards. This representation can then be used
by other projects in digital philosophy, such as the Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) and PhilPapers, along
with resources outside of digital philosophy enabled by the
LinkedHumanities project.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.1.2 [Information Systems]: User/Machine Systems
; I.2.4 [Artificial Intelligence]: Knowledge Representa-
tion Formalisms and Methods—representations, semantic
networks
1. INTRODUCTION
“Information explosion”and“semantic web”are metaphors
that have become cliche´s. Like many popular phrases they
capture some important aspects of the situation, while dis-
guising others. There has been rapid growth in the availabil-
ity of both new and old materials on the Internet. The result
of this rapid expansion is not, however, the pile of shrapnel
that “explosion” might suggest. Rather, there is a highly
linked set of pieces captured by the phrase “semantic web”,
which represents the connectivity but suggests a rigid ap-
proach to meaning that has fueled skepticism, and obscures
the extent to which the possible semantic relations them-
selves grow exponentially as the number of linked sources
increases. Thus, we prefer to characterize the situation as a
“semantic explosion in the information web”. This semantic
explosion constitutes perhaps the most challenging problem
that automatic methods for dealing with the information
web must face.
Consider the problem of linking concepts as they occur in
one philosophical resource to the concepts in another. Take,
for instance, the term “realism”. It is not adequate to treat
the term as a proxy for a concept and link every occurrence
of “realism” to every other because the term’s meaning is
context-sensitive according to whether it occurs in ethics,
metaphysics, or political philosophy (among others), not to
mention even finer contexts right down to the level of in-
dividual passages by authors who may use terms idiosyn-
cratically. Even if one has disambiguated the term within a
given digital resource or project, there remains the problem
of how to link the disambiguated senses to occurrences of
the term in other digital philosophy projects. As the web
of information grows, so too do the interactions among its
parts. So, noticing that realism is contrasted with idealism
in some contexts (or databases), but with anti-realism in
others, leads one to the question of whether the relationship
between idealism and anti-realism is synonymy, and whether
idealism in political philosophy is at all related to idealism in
metaphysics. Furthermore, in trying to connect “realism” as
that term is disambiguated in the Indiana Philosophy On-
tology, to that term as it appears in other sources of philo-
sophical content, such as the refereed journal articles covered
in the PhilPapers database or the crowd-sourced Wikipedia
entries on philosophical topics, there is a huge challenge in
determining which “realism” belongs with which.
An appealing idea, at this point, is to regiment all of this
into one overarching computational ontology that precisely
fixes all the possible meanings. We think, however, that this
one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to succeed for a number
of reasons. There may be pragmatically useful alternative
ways of representing relationships among the data.[3] While
we agree that a wide variety of digital humanities projects
can benefit from the development of taxonomic schemes
that make use of certain techniques of the computational
ontologist, there are important differences between ontol-
ogy design for the humanities and the approaches favored
in other areas. Ontology science has evolved in large part
to suit the needs of large projects in medicine, business,
and the natural sciences. These domains share a cluster of
features: their underlying structures have a relatively sta-
ble consensus, projects are amply funded, and a primary
goal is often to render interoperable large bodies of data.
In these projects, the best practices often require hiring so-
called “double experts” – knowledge modelers highly trained
in both ontology design and the subject domains – to pro-
duce a representation in the early stages of a project which
is optimally comprehensive and technically precise.
There is a cluster of digital humanities applications, how-
ever, for which these practices are not ideal. These involve
projects with principles of open-access and domains with-
out the ample funding of the natural sciences. Additionally,
ontologies for domains in which structural understanding is
controversial or constantly evolving and projects which uti-
lize computational ontologies to enhance search or naviga-
tion through asynchronously-updated digital resources must
account for the dynamic nature of their resources – whether
it is in the underlying corpus or in the judgments of the
experts providing feedback on domain structure. On the
positive side, these areas often offer more opportunities to
collect feedback from users who are domain experts (but
who lack expertise in ontology design).
Digital philosophy has many of the features described in
the previous paragraph, and different projects have pursued
different approaches to taxonomizing the subject matter of
the discipline. The InPhO project starts with a top-level
structure — a basic taxonomy provided by the editorial
structure of the SEP — and a list of key terms assembled
from various sources. We then data-mine the text of the
encyclopedia to derive statistical hypotheses about term-
relatedness. These hypotheses are presented to experts in
a simple question format. Their answers drive an auto-
mated reasoning system to populate the seed taxonomy.
This approach contrasts with PhilPapers, which employs a
folksonomy-type approach to classifying the articles in its
database. Another contrast is provided by DBpedia, which
uses automated tools to extract lists of concepts and philoso-
phers from the markup language used in the crowd-sourced
Wikipedia articles. Our goal is to align these various repre-
sentations based on semantic information embedded in them
and the texts on which they are based. Given a taxonomy of
concepts, for example, nearest neighbors and other related
terms can help determine whether “realism” at a given lo-
cation in one structure should be mapped to the same term
appearing in another. The methods need to be as automatic
as possible so that they can continue to be deployed even as
the structures provided by these different projects change as
a result of new input.
2. ONTOLOGY DESIGN
Effective ontology design for the humanities faces a num-
ber of sometimes conflicting desiderata. Formal approaches
emphasize consistency, and in scientific contexts this can be
achieved by axiomatizing the meanings of the terms rep-
resented. However, in the humanities, term meanings are
among the most contested aspects of the disciplines. An-
other desideratum is completeness of coverage, which is ham-
pered, however, by inadequate techniques for automatic term
discovery, and vagueness about whether certain terms even
belong to a given discipline. Usability is yet another desider-
atum, but usability by whom or by what? Formal ontologies
stress machine readability and reasoning. However, given
the semantic complexity and context sensitivity of terms in
the humanities, usability by humans may be a more appro-
priate goal. The context-sensitivity also raises pragmatic is-
sues relative to the various audiences. In a scientific gene on-
tology, for instance, it is clear that the end users are experts
in the field for whom a large degree of consensus exists. In
the humanities, however, there is much less consensus among
experts, and disagreement is even encouraged. Representa-
tions of humanities disciplines, including philosophy, need
to allow for the range of interpretations that different users
will provide. Finally, scholarship in the humanities consists
of suggesting novel interpretations of existing texts, new ar-
guments and criticism, and novel concepts, necessitating not
just the addition of new materials to existing databases, but
continuously contributing to the semantic explosion as these
new approaches interact with the existing structures. It is
essential to automate as far as possible the maintenance of
any digital representation of philosophy, lest the existing
structures become quickly obsolete and abandoned.
In the following sections, we review the main approaches
to ontology design, folksonomy and formal ontology. We
conclude by outlining the principles of our favored approach,
which we call “dynamic ontology”, which attempts to lever-
age the strengths of each approach in semi-automatically
generating structured representations of target domains.
2.1 Folksonomy
Social web (Web 2.0) and semantic web research were,
for a time, conducted largely independently. Indeed, ini-
tial explorations of social computing were driven by skep-
tics of the grand unifying vision of the semantic web (e.g.
[37]), who explicitly proposed“folksonomy”as an alternative
method. This mutual antipathy may not be surprising, as
the two approaches seem to offer competing visions for the
future of the Internet. Social web researchers devise ways to
harness the “wisdom of the crowds” to structure web data
around information obtained from collaborative social inter-
actions between large numbers of amateur users. Semantic
web researchers, on the other hand, emphasized the need
for a technically precise backbone of formal ontologies de-
veloped by small groups of experts highly-trained in the best
practices of ontology design. Cultural differences have fur-
ther fueled misconceptions and misunderstandings between
these two research communities, often leading them to re-
gard one another with mutual skepticism — though influen-
tial researchers have now recognized that the two approaches
are not only not in conflict, but can even be complementary
[9].
Both approaches have had some striking successes. Web
2.0 applications like Wikipedia, Facebook, Del.icio.us, and
Flickr have reshaped the way average users interact with
the Web. A key strength of such approaches lies in their
ability to obtain large amounts of information from unskilled
volunteers and to combine information obtained from many
different kinds of sources creatively.
Since Thomas Vander Wal coined the term folksonomy in
2004 [37], there has been a surge of research on the effective-
ness of folksonomy (see review in [36]). The use of the term
itself is not precise, but a folksonomy is usually regarded
as particular kind of knowledge base, one resulting from or
induced upon the vocabulary derived from the collective tag-
ging of shared resources by users in an online community.
Folksonomy as a method comes with many advantages —
the collection and organization of tags is virtually free, and
the population of the knowledge base with resources with
community relevance is guaranteed. Reviewers of taxonomic
approaches have been encouraged by research on the “Wis-
dom of the Crowds”, believing that the precision and recall
of emergent tag behavior, once stabilized, will be superior
to alternative methods.
From the beginning, critics recognized that folksonomy
would face a variety of serious challenges. Mathes (2004)
noted that tagging-based approaches inherently faces the
problems of ambiguity, inconsistent orthography, and the
unnoticed synonomy “inherent to an uncontrolled vocabu-
lary”. Many have worried about the idiosyncratic nature of
tagging (characterized as the “long tail” phenomena, which
describes the tendency of tag distributions to have a large
number of rarely-used terms), though some research has
shown that a stabilization of terminology can be reached
in a community after a small amount of initial tagging be-
havior[7, 11]. Other studies, however, have shown that in-
dividual tagging behavior can evolve over time[4] as users
become more familiar with the resources, raising challenges
of intra-user lexical stability — though such behavior can
gravitate towards “netlingo” tags that are not suitable for
many taxonomic purposes (e.g. “fail”, “toread”, and “yum”
— see [16]).
Many tagging systems have components designed to facil-
itate the stabilization of vocabulary — del.icio.us suggests
commonly used tags, for example. Experts have also worried
about the shallow depth of the taxonomic schemes induced
on tags — Quintarelli (2005) noted the their lack of hierar-
chy, together with the concomitant difficulty in scaling the
method up to organize larger knowledge bases. If tags are
freely submitted by users, one must also worry about sim-
ply invalid tags; a study by Stvilia and Jorgensen shows that
37% of Flickr tags used in the Flickr Commons Project were
misspelled or otherwise invalid, though this could be reduced
to 15.3% with some simple pre-processing rules. A further
worry of Kroski (2005) is that folksonomies are subject to
“gaming”; because folksonomy systems often treat each user
as an equal peer, they are vulnerable to “unethical users”
who might “propagate tags ... in order to corrupt a sys-
tem” (as a result, such systems would be wise to exploit user
provenance data — e.g. see the ExpertRank system of John
and Seligmann 2006 , and see Koutrika et al. 2007 ). Some
have suggested that training users in tagging might help
mitigate some of these problems [10], though other research
has shown that users often balk at such training [19] and if
financial incentives were required this approach would begin
to incur the costs associated with double experts. In addi-
tion, Stvilia et al. 2011 found that the relationship between
user tagging experience and perception of tagging quality is
complex, with age and tagging experience being inversely re-
lated to the perceived suitability of tag-supplied terms, but
Flickr familiarity and indexing experience having a positive
relationship with term rating.
As clusters of tagging behaviors emerge, a further chal-
lenge is presented when one tries to use folksonomies to
support tasks traditionally ascribed to ontologies — such as
supporting reasoning and data interoperability. A variety of
systems have been devised to leverage tagging libraries into
ontologies, either using automated information-extraction or
by designing tools which help users arrange tags in taxo-
nomic relationships; but since tags are merely words applied
to resources, these approaches face many of the same chal-
lenges that are faced by systems which attempt to learn tax-
onomies directly from text, including synonymy, polysemy,
slang, inconsistent lexical forms and misspellings, and vary-
ing levels of generality. Marchetti et al (2007) have proposed
that providing semantic support to taggers from resources
like Wordnet and Wikipedia can help mitigate some of these
challenges. Several approaches have been proposed to learn
taxonomies and ontologies by using statistical techniques on
tag distributions as a solution to this problem [28, 12, 1, 35],
though all struggle with challenges posed by unregulated vo-
cabulary and none offer the same rich level of structure as
manually-encoded ontologies.
2.2 Upper-level Ontology
The grand vision of the formal “ontological” approach to
the semantic web is to take a multi-layered approach to mod-
eling reality. The task is divided into two levels: Lower-level
domain ontologies are constructed to describe the entities
of interest in specific domains; the types in the lower-level
ontologies are then linked into a so-called “upper-level ontol-
ogy”, intended to describe the most basic, enduring features
of reality. While by the nature of the method change is
much more challenging on the formal ontological approach
than with folksonomy, some of the largest formal domain
ontology projects aspire to dynamism; the Gene Ontology
project, for example, claims to offer “a controlled vocabu-
lary that can be used for dynamic maintenance and interop-
erability between genome databases” [17]. Such dynamism
is possible in the context of large biomedical informatics
projects because they involve the efforts of very many dedi-
cated biomedical informatics specialists working with man-
ually designed taxonomies and ontologies. New data come
pre-annotated because of the sophisticated equipment used
for sequencing and other experiments. These features are
only possible for deep-pocketed projects in domains study-
ing relatively stable structure (though conceptual structure
even in biology may not be so stable as one would think [8]).
The most significant challenges facing formal ontology are
economic. Once elaborate and precise ontologies have been
created, semantic web projects have faced the dilemma of
either hiring expensive “double experts” to populate and
maintain them or face inevitable data and user sparseness
[3]. A further economic challenge is posed by the fact that
projects developing domain-level ontologies are never sure
which upper-level ontology should be linked to. Upper-level
ontologies have now been an active area of research for fif-
teen years, and the diversity of choices appears to be in-
creasing rather than decreasing. Modelers are now faced
with a bewildering choice between a variety of inconsistent
upper-level ontologies — including SUMO, DOLCE (and
DnS), BFO, GFO, IDEAS, Cyc (and UMBEL), PROTON,
OCHRE, and Sowa’s [29, 20]. Debates in this area are bitter
and protracted, given that there is often a significant com-
mercial gains to be won by emerging as the “one ontology to
unite them all”. Many formal ontologists have by now aban-
doned the goal of selecting a single upper-level ontology [31],
and recently attempts have been made to map the diverging
upper-level ontologies into each other, such as COSMO (con-
structed largely out of categories from Cyc and SUMO) The
most serious effect of these“ontology wars”has been that the
population of elaborately-designed ontologies by the large
amount of data already available on the web has languished
while the battles are fought. Frustration with this process
has in turn driven interest in alternative approaches to in-
teroperability, such as the Linked Data initiative [2] which
tries to obviate the need for upper-level ontologies by di-
rectly linking data in shared repositories (such as DBPedia
and Freebase) .
More broadly, the debate over formal ontologies is situated
within a paradigm shift within artificial intelligence. The
original vision of logic-based AI held that computers could
display intelligence if only we could encode enough explicit
expert knowledge into their systems. Though it quickly
became apparent that this was a hopeless approach, the
grand vision of “just getting enough knowledge” formally-
specified continued to live on in the Cyc project for decades
(as the largest remaining attempt in true artificial intelli-
gence). Nowadays, even Cycorp has largely conceded this
point — themselves turning away from grand visions of pass-
ing the Turing test with more specific practical goals, such
as database translation. The push towards manual encoding
and population of formal ontologies in the semantic web can
further be seen as the last gasp of this knowledge-based ap-
proach to AI. Meanwhile, IBM’s DeepQA system, showcased
in Watson, starkly illustrates the lesson that, outside of a
few specialized applications, it will simply never be practical
to encode every scrap of knowledge in a clean, precise for-
mal system [6]. Using a complex and heterogeneous system
consisting of layers upon layers of diverse statistical meth-
ods, heuristics, partial ontologies, and ad-hoc tuning, the
DeepQA methodology demonstrates that double experts are
too expensive, and knowledge evolves too quickly for them
to keep up with the problem at any hourly rate — espe-
cially in domains like the humanities. Practical intelligence,
rather, requires a vastly more efficient tangle of statistical
and ontological prowess, with both humans and computers
contributing only what they do best.
3. DYNAMIC ONTOLOGY
At the InPhO project, we have developed a methodol-
ogy for ontology population called dynamic ontology, which
alleviates the need for double experts, while addressing con-
cerns about consistency, completeness and change through
machine learning over a domain corpus, and concerns about
usability and pragmatics through human input and seman-
tic web standards. Dynamic ontology follows a three-stage
pipeline of data mining, feedback collection, and machine
reasoning, summarized in Section 3.1. The core of dynamic
ontology is the marriage of both human and computational
resources in the design process. While human experts may
be locally-blinded by their own familiarity with a subdo-
main, algorithmic processes can keep perspective over the
entire corpus. Similarly, while data mining techniques may
struggle with word sense disambiguation, human feedback
can easily resolve such inconsistencies. This set of checks
and balances helps maintain consistency in the resulting on-
tology.
As mentioned in the introduction, our pragmatic approach
recognizes the likelihood that there is no single, correct view
of the discipline. However, even if other projects do not
agree with the InPhO’s taxonomic projection, our statisti-
cal data and expert evaluations may still be useful for filling
out alternative representations of the discipline. By expos-
ing our data from each of the three steps in our procedure
through an easy-to-use API, we enable the adoption of our
system by other projects seeking alternative ways to con-
struct meaningful and useful representations of the disci-
pline. Additionally, by offering an open platform, we invite
other projects to contribute relevant data and expert feed-
back to improve the quality of the service. By enabling link-
ages between the different representations, it becomes possi-
ble for end users to move among the different digital philoso-
phy resources and make semantically interesting connections
based upon their understanding of the concepts involved.
Thus, for example, the InPhO does not seek to replicate
the cross-referencing structure of the SEP, but it provides
data that the editors can use to select appropriate cross-
references for the entries. Also, by providing links from each
entry in the SEP to a dedicated InPhO page, readers can
explore the concept network given by the InPhO represen-
tation, and use the InPhO portal as a way to discover other
related resources outside the SEP, or to navigate back to
related SEP articles via the InPhO taxonomy. Eventually,
given fuller integration with PhilPapers, for example, it will
be possible for end users and developers to navigate the
conceptual space, the bibliographic network, and the link-
ages between specific thinkers using resources from all the
various data providers.
3.1 The InPhO Workflow
Data Mining — Natural Language Processing (NLP)
techniques are used over an external corpus (the SEP) to
generate a lexicon of concepts and statistical hypotheses
about semantic relevance and generality relations among
various topics in the corpus. From this corpus we gener-
ate a co-occurrence graph in which each node represents a
term in our set of keywords. An edge between two nodes in-
dicates that the terms co-occur at least once. For each edge,
the directed J-measure [32, 23] and conditional entropy [30]
is calculated bidirectionally. The J-measure calculates the
interestingness of inducing the rule“Whenever idea i is men-
tioned in a fragment of text, then idea j is mentioned as well”
(for details see Niepert et al. 2007). This is used as a proxy
for semantic relevance of term i to term j. While the J-
measure can be used to estimate semantic distance, we are
currently investigating alternative measures of semantic dis-
tance, as reviewed in Resnik (1999). We then apply to each
node an informational metric of entropy. Entropy is used as
a proxy for the generality of a each term, on the assumption
that more general terms will have higher entropy. By com-
bining these relevance and entropy measures, we obtain a
directed estimate of hypernymy/hyponymy–the basic build-
ing blocks of taxonomies. Further details on data mining
techniques can be found in [23].
Feedback Collection — The statistical hypotheses about
hypernymy and hyponymy are presented to domain experts
through online interfaces located both on the InPhO web-
site and through the SEP editorial interface. Evaluations
are presented as pairs of concepts, with a slider to indi-
cate the relatedness of two terms, and a selection of whether
the first term is more specific, more general, as general as,
or incomparable with the second term. Users self-report
levels of expertise when they sign up for our system, and
each feedback fact is recorded with provenance information.
This allows us to stratify feedback by self-reported education
level and leverage expertise to resolve feedback inconsisten-
cies. Experiments have been conducted on the effects of this
stratification [22] and upon feedback collected from Amazon
Mechanical Turk users[5]. Further details on feedback col-
lection can be found in [25].
Machine Reasoning — User feedback is then combined
with the statistical measures as the input for our machine
reasoning program, which uses answer set programming to
output a taxonomic view of the discipline. To reduce com-
putational complexity, a seed taxonomy created by domain
experts is added to the input. Variations in the answer set
program, the subset of user feedback used, the data mining
techniques, or the seed taxonomy can allow us to generate
different representations of the discipline. These variations
can then be evaluated against the external corpus to find
the most suitable population method [22]. Further details
on the answer set programming techniques can be found in
[24].
4. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We are currently engaged in two projects that will con-
tribute to the management of the semantic explosion on
the information web that we described in the introduction.
These projects will expand the range of digital philosophy
projects and enable connections to other digital databases
not solely concerned with philosophy. This expansion has
at least two different fronts. On the one hand, as different
pieces of the semantic and social webs become connected, the
appropriate linkages between entities in these pieces need to
be established. In the LinkedHumanities project, in collab-
oration with the University of Mannheim and jointly funded
by the DFG in Germany and the NEH in the United States,
we are exploring ways of matching entities across the various
databases that contain semantic information about the con-
cepts and major figures already represented by the InPhO.
In the Digging by Debating project with partners in the UK,
and joint funding from the NEH and JISC in the UK, we
will be attempting to map the interactions among philoso-
phy and the sciences across various timescales, using data
from Hathi Trust, PhilPapers, and InPhO. The resulting
tools will enable users to discover and represent arguments
appearing both in historical texts and current articles.
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